IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/iis/dispap/iiisdp245.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Open International Markets without Exclusion: Encompassing Domestic Institutions, Excludable Goods, and International Public Goods

Author

Listed:
  • William Phelan

Abstract

This paper uses the concept of the ‘encompassing group’ to set out a collective action theory based explanation for the maintenance of open international markets to add to existing explanations for stable international market regimes, hegemonic stability and tit-for-tat specific reciprocity. While groups representing small constituencies have incentives to seek inefficient redistributions of income while imposing costs on wider society, cohesive groups representing large cross-issue constituencies – encompassing groups – have incentives to accept costs in return for the provision of public goods. States whose domestic political institutions are encompassing – inclusive of large numbers of diverse interests and centralized to provide coordination across issue-areas – have similar incentives to accept costs on constituents in order to support the provision of public goods for their constituents as a whole – such as welfare gains from trade or avoiding damage to reliable international markets – even without the application of external sanctions.

Suggested Citation

  • William Phelan, 2008. "Open International Markets without Exclusion: Encompassing Domestic Institutions, Excludable Goods, and International Public Goods," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series iiisdp245, IIIS.
  • Handle: RePEc:iis:dispap:iiisdp245 Note: Length:
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.tcd.ie/iiis/documents/discussion/pdfs/iiisdp245.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fearon, James D., 1995. "Rationalist explanations for war," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(03), pages 379-414, June.
    2. Stein, Arthur A., 1984. "The hegemon's dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the international economic order," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(02), pages 355-386, March.
    3. Ruggie, John Gerard, 1982. "International regimes, transactions, and change: embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 36(02), pages 379-415, March.
    4. Martin, Lisa L., 1992. "Interests, power, and multilateralism," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(04), pages 765-792, September.
    5. Dani Rodrik, 1997. "Has Globalization Gone Too Far?," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 57.
    6. repec:cup:apsrev:v:80:y:1986:i:04:p:1151-1169_18 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Philip Jones, 2007. "Colluding victims: A public choice analysis of international alliances," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 319-332, September.
    8. Charan Devereaux & Robert Z. Lawrence & Michael D. Watkins, 2006. "Case Studies in US Trade Negotiation, 2-volume set," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 3640.
    9. Moravcsik, Andrew, 1997. "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 51(04), pages 513-553, September.
    10. Rogowski, Ronald, 1987. "Trade and the variety of democratic institutions," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 41(02), pages 203-223, March.
    11. Koremenos, Barbara & Lipson, Charles & Snidal, Duncan, 2001. "The Rational Design of International Institutions," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 55(04), pages 761-799, September.
    12. Robert Z. Lawrence, 2003. "Crimes and Punishments?: Retaliation under the WTO," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 372.
    13. Fearon, James D., 1998. "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 52(02), pages 269-305, March.
    14. John Driffill, 2006. "The Centralization of Wage Bargaining Revisited: What Have we Learnt?," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44, pages 731-756, November.
    15. Burley, Anne-Marie & Mattli, Walter, 1993. "Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 47(01), pages 41-76, December.
    16. Snidal, Duncan, 1985. "The limits of hegemonic stability theory," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 39(04), pages 579-614, September.
    17. Milner, Helen V. & Kubota, Keiko, 2005. "Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 59(01), pages 107-143, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. William Phelan, 2008. "Why do EU Member States Offer a 'Constitutional' Obedience to EU Obligations? Encompassing Domestic Institutions and Costly International Obligations," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series iiisdp256, IIIS.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iis:dispap:iiisdp245. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Colette Keleher). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/cetcdie.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.