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Crimes and Punishments?: Retaliation under the WTO

Author

Listed:
  • Robert Z. Lawrence

    (Peterson Institute for International Economics)

Abstract

One of the unique aspects of the WTO as an international organization is that it authorizes members to retaliate against violations by raising tariffs. These authorizations have become increasingly common and increasingly controversial. In this analysis of the retaliation system, Robert Lawrence considers the guiding principles that govern responses to WTO violations, examines how these principles are implemented in practice, and considers options for reform.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert Z. Lawrence, 2003. "Crimes and Punishments?: Retaliation under the WTO," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 372.
    • Handle: RePEc:iie:ppress:372
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    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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    Cited by:

    1. Benjamin H. Liebman & Kasaundra M. Tomlin, 2008. "Safeguards and Retaliatory Threats," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(2), pages 351-376, May.
    2. Songying Fang & Erica Owen, 2011. "International institutions and credible commitment of non-democracies," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 141-162, July.
    3. Limão, Nuno & Saggi, Kamal, 2013. "Size inequality, coordination externalities and international trade agreements," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 10-27.
    4. Kyle Bagwell & Chad P. Bown & Robert W. Staiger, 2016. "Is the WTO Passé?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1125-1231, December.
    5. Nuno Limão & Kamal Saggi, 2018. "Tariff retaliation versus financial compensation in the enforcement of international trade agreements," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: Economic Analysis of the Rules and Regulations of the World Trade Organization, chapter 13, pages 299-311 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    6. Nathan Jensen, 2007. "International institutions and market expectations: Stock price responses to the WTO ruling on the 2002 U.S. steel tariffs," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 261-280, September.
    7. William Phelan, 2008. "Open International Markets without Exclusion: Encompassing Domestic Institutions, Excludable Goods, and International Public Goods," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series iiisdp245, IIIS.
    8. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2004. "Subsidy Agreements," NBER Working Papers 10292, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. repec:bla:ecinqu:v:55:y:2017:i:3:p:1213-1230 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. William Phelan, 2008. "Why do EU Member States Offer a 'Constitutional' Obedience to EU Obligations? Encompassing Domestic Institutions and Costly International Obligations," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series iiisdp256, IIIS.
    11. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2016. "The Design of Trade Agreements," NBER Working Papers 22087, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Richard Chisik & Harun Onder, 2017. "Does Limited Punishment Limit The Scope For Cross Retaliation?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(3), pages 1213-1230, July.
    13. repec:wsi:wschap:9789813233058_0016 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. George von Furstenberg, 2008. "Performance Measurement under Rational International Overpromising Regimes," CAEPR Working Papers 2008-005, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington.
    15. Giovanni Maggi & Robert W. Staiger, 2008. "On the Role and Design of Dispute Settlement Procedures in International Trade Agreements," NBER Working Papers 14067, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Latorre, María C. & Yonezawa, Hidemichi, 2018. "Stopped TTIP? Its potential impact on the world and the role of neglected FDI," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 99-120.
    17. Benjamin Liebman & Kasaundra Tomlin, 2015. "World Trade Organization sanctions, implementation, and retaliation," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 715-745, March.
    18. Keck, Alexander & Schropp, Simon, 2007. "Indisputably essential: The economics of dispute settlement institutions in trade agreements," WTO Staff Working Papers ERSD-2007-02, World Trade Organization (WTO), Economic Research and Statistics Division.
    19. Giovanni Maggi & Robert W. Staiger, 2009. "Breach, Remedies and Dispute Settlement in Trade Agreements," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1735, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    20. Richard Chisik & Chuyi Fang, 2019. "Limited Cross-retaliation and Lengthy Delays in International Dispute Settlement," Working Papers 066, Ryerson University, Department of Economics.
    21. Tadashi Ito, 2007. "NAFTA and productivity convergence between Mexico and the US," IHEID Working Papers 26-2007, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies, revised 27 Nov 2007.
    22. Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, 2013. "Bite the Bullet: Trade Retaliation, EU Jurisprudence and the Law and Economics of 'Taking One for the Team'," RSCAS Working Papers 2013/32, European University Institute.
    23. Kevin x.d. Huang & Engin Volkan & M. ege Yazgan, 2013. "Nonhomothetic Preferences with Habit Formation in Nondurable and Durable Consumption: Implications for Sectoral Comovement," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 13-00002, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.

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