Contingent payments in selection contests
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-007-0030-7
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- M'Hand Fares & Luis Orozco, 2014. "Tournament Mechanism in Wine-Grape Contracts: Evidence from a French Wine Cooperative," Post-Print hal-01093245, HAL.
- Kräkel, Matthias & Schöttner, Anja, 2012. "Internal labor markets and worker rents," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 491-509.
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- Jennifer Brown & Dylan B. Minor, 2011. "Selecting the Best? Spillover and Shadows in Elimination Tournaments," NBER Working Papers 17639, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Fu, Qiang & Lu, Jingfeng & Lu, Yuanzhu, 2012. "Incentivizing R&D: Prize or subsidies?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 67-79.
- Penghuan Yan, 2024. "Balancing Selection Efficiency and Societal Costs in Selective Contests," Papers 2409.09768, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
- Werner Güth & René Levínský & Kerstin Pull & Ori Weisel, 2016.
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Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 20(1), pages 69-88, March.
- Werner Güth & René Levínský & Kerstin Pull & Ori Weisel, 2016. "Tournaments and piece rates revisited: a theoretical and experimental study of output-dependent prize tournaments," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 20(1), pages 69-88, March.
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More about this item
Keywords
Research contest; Selection; Rank-order; Contingent payment; D82; M52; D72;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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