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Setting the Stakes in Environmental Contests

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  • Liston-Heyes, Catherine

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  • Liston-Heyes, Catherine, 2001. "Setting the Stakes in Environmental Contests," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 1-12, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:41:y:2001:i:1:p:1-12
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Chung, Tai-Yeong, 1996. "Rent-Seeking Contest When the Prize Increases with Aggregate Efforts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 87(1-2), pages 55-66, April.
    2. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Kim, In-Gyu, 1997. "Delegation in contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 281-298, May.
    3. Porter, Richard C., 1988. "Environmental negotiation: Its potential and its economic efficiency," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 129-142, June.
    4. Baik Kyung Hwan & Shogren Jason F., 1994. "Environmental Conflicts with Reimbursement for Citizen Suits," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 1-20, July.
    5. Heyes, Anthony G., 1997. "Environmental Regulation by Private Contest," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 407-428, February.
    6. Glazer, Amihai, 1993. "On the Incentives to Establish and Play Political Rent-Seeking Games," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 75(2), pages 139-148, February.
    7. Linster, Bruce G, 1994. "Cooperative Rent-Seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 81(1-2), pages 23-34, October.
    8. Long, Ngo Van & Vousden, Neil J, 1987. "Risk-Averse Rent Seeking with Shared Rents," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 97(388), pages 971-985, December.
    9. Posner, Richard A, 1975. "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 807-827, August.
    10. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
    11. Hurley, Terrance M. & Shogren, Jason F., 1998. "Effort levels in a Cournot Nash contest with asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 195-210, June.
    12. Gradstein, Mark, 1993. "Rent Seeking and the Provision of Public Goods," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(420), pages 1236-1243, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sartzetakis, Eftichis & Xepapadeas, Anastasios & Petrakis, Emmanuel, 2008. "The role of information provision as a policy instrument to supplement environmental taxes: Empowering consumers to choose optimally," MPRA Paper 12083, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Lambert Schoonbeek, 2007. "Delegation with multiple instruments in a rent-seeking contest," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(3), pages 453-464, June.
    3. Dijkstra, Bouwe R., 2007. "An investment contest to influence environmental policy," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 300-324, November.
    4. Daniel Cardona & Jenny De Freitas & Antoni Rubí-Barceló, 2018. "Polarization or Moderation? Intra-group heterogeneity in endogenous-policy contest," DEA Working Papers 87, Universitat de les Illes Balears, Departament d'Economía Aplicada.
    5. Tim Friehe, 2013. "The Role of Investment in Environmental Lobbying Contests," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 56(3), pages 337-352, November.
    6. Pim Heijnen & Lambert Schoonbeek, 2008. "Environmental groups in monopolistic markets," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 39(4), pages 379-396, April.

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