On the Incentives to Establish and Play Political Rent-Seeking Games
Legislators will enact programs that encourage rent-seeking only if they can thereby increase their chances of winn ing election or of receiving contributions themselves. This paper shows rent-seeking to be electorally robust--both voters and contributors will often avoid a candidate who proposes to eliminate rent-seeking. Important exceptions arise, however, if contributions are more likel y to help challengers than incumbents and if legislators prefer that some firm rather than another receive governmental contracts. Copyright 1993 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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