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Complete-rent-dissipation contest design

Author

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  • Kawamori, Tomohiko

Abstract

We consider contest success functions (CSFs) that exhibit complete rent dissipation. If the prize values are observable by the contest designer, for any value tuple, we show that there exists a CSF that exhibits complete dissipation in any equilibrium if and only if the number of contestants is greater than or equal to three or the values are homogeneous. If the values are unobservable by the contest designer, we show that there exists no CSF that exhibits complete dissipation in some equilibrium for any value tuple.

Suggested Citation

  • Kawamori, Tomohiko, 2023. "Complete-rent-dissipation contest design," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 232(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:232:y:2023:i:c:s0165176523003713
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111346
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Contest success function; Complete rent dissipation; Observable or unobservable values; Equivalence in aggregate efforts across equilibria;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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