IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ubi/deawps/87.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Polarization or Moderation? Intra-group heterogeneity in endogenous-policy contest

Author

Listed:
  • Daniel Cardona

    (Universitat de les Illes Balears)

  • Jenny De Freitas

    (Universitat de les Illes Balears)

  • Antoni Rubí-Barceló

    (Universitat de les Illes Balears)

Abstract

We analyze the selection of a policy platform by a group of heterogeneous agents to confront the status quo policy defended by another group in a subsequent contest. This policy choice results from the interaction between the inter-group effects that lead to strategic restraint and the intra-group effects due to the heterogeneity among challengers. We detail the conditions that give rise to polarization or moderation of the selected challenging policy with respect to what would be selected by this group in the absence of any struggle.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Cardona & Jenny De Freitas & Antoni Rubí-Barceló, 2018. "Polarization or Moderation? Intra-group heterogeneity in endogenous-policy contest," DEA Working Papers 87, Universitat de les Illes Balears, Departament d'Economía Aplicada.
    • Handle: RePEc:ubi:deawps:87
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.uib.es/depart/deaweb/deawp/pdf/w87.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Wittman, Donald, 1983. "Candidate Motivation: A Synthesis of Alternative Theories," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 77(1), pages 142-157, March.
    2. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Kim, In-Gyu, 1997. "Delegation in contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 281-298, May.
    3. Herrera, Helios & Levine, David K. & Martinelli, César, 2008. "Policy platforms, campaign spending and voter participation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 501-513, April.
    4. NITZAN, Shmuel & UEDA, Kaoru, 2016. "Selective Incentives and Intra-Group Heterogeneity in Collective Contents," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-24, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
    5. Pau Balart & Sabine Flamand & Orestis Troumpounis, 2016. "Strategic choice of sharing rules in collective contests," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(2), pages 239-262, February.
    6. Tim Friehe, 2013. "The Role of Investment in Environmental Lobbying Contests," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 56(3), pages 337-352, November.
    7. Liston-Heyes, Catherine, 2001. "Setting the Stakes in Environmental Contests," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 1-12, January.
    8. Aragonès, Enriqueta & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2012. "Candidate quality in a Downsian model with a continuous policy space," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 464-480.
    9. Norman Schofield, 2006. "Equilibria in the spatial stochastic model of voting with party activists," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 10(3), pages 183-203, December.
    10. Epstein, Gil S. & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2004. "Strategic restraint in contests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 201-210, February.
    11. Rothstein, Paul, 1991. "Representative Voter Theorems," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 72(2-3), pages 193-212, December.
    12. Aragones, Enriqueta & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2002. "Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model with a Favored Candidate," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 131-161, March.
    13. Pau Balart & Sabine Flamand & Orestis Troumpounis, 2014. "Strategic choice of sharing rules in collective contests," Working Papers 64402108, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
    14. Kyung Hwan Baik, 2007. "Equilibrium Contingent Compensation in Contests with Delegation," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 73(4), pages 986-1002, April.
    15. Cardona, Daniel & Rubí-Barceló, Antoni, 2016. "Group-contests with endogenous claims," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 97-111.
    16. Schoonbeek, Lambert, 2004. "Delegation in a group-contest," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 263-272, March.
    17. Kyung Hwan Baik, 2007. "Equilibrium Contingent Compensation in Contests with Delegation," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 73(4), pages 986-1002, April.
    18. Lindbeck, Assar & Weibull, Jorgen W., 1993. "A model of political equilibrium in a representative democracy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 195-209, June.
    19. Nitzan, Shmuel & Ueda, Kaoru, 2011. "Prize sharing in collective contests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(5), pages 678-687, June.
    20. Ashworth, Scott & Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan, 2009. "Elections with platform and valence competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 191-216, September.
    21. Martin Kolmar & Andreas Wagener, 2013. "Inefficiency As A Strategic Device In Group Contests Against Dominant Opponents," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 51(4), pages 2083-2095, October.
    22. Jennifer Carter & John W. Patty, 2015. "Valence and Campaigns," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 59(4), pages 825-840, October.
    23. Gil S. Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2007. "Endogenous Public Policy and Contests," Springer Books, Springer, number 978-3-540-74818-2, September.
    24. Wittman, Donald, 1977. "Candidates with policy preferences: A dynamic model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 180-189, February.
    25. Ordeshook, Peter C., 1980. "Political Disequilibrium and Scientific Inquiry: A Comment on William Riker's “Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutionsâ€," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 74(2), pages 447-450, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Balart, Pau & Casas, Agustin & Troumpounis, Orestis, 2022. "Technological change, campaign spending and polarization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Daniel Cardona & Jenny Freitas & Antoni Rubí-Barceló, 2023. "Polarization and conflict among groups with heterogeneous members," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(1), pages 199-219, July.
    2. Lambert Schoonbeek, 2007. "Delegation with multiple instruments in a rent-seeking contest," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(3), pages 453-464, June.
    3. Konrad, Kai A., 2007. "Strategy in contests: an introduction [Strategie in Turnieren – eine Einführung]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2007-01, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    4. De Donder, Philippe & Gallego, Maria, 2017. "Electoral Competition and Party Positioning," TSE Working Papers 17-760, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    5. Balart, Pau & Casas, Agustin & Troumpounis, Orestis, 2022. "Technological change, campaign spending and polarization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
    6. Livio Di Lonardo, 2017. "Valence uncertainty and the nature of the candidate pool in elections," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(2), pages 327-350, April.
    7. Alexander Shapoval & Shlomo Weber & Alexei Zakharov, 2019. "Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(3), pages 713-753, September.
    8. Aragonès, Enriqueta & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2017. "Voters' private valuation of candidates' quality," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 121-130.
    9. Raghul S. Venkatesh, 2020. "Political activism and polarization," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(5), pages 1530-1558, September.
    10. Fabian Gouret & Stéphane Rossignol, 2019. "Intensity valence," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(1), pages 63-112, June.
    11. Daniel Cardona & Jenny De Freitas & Antoni Rubí-Barceló, 2021. "Environmental policy contests: command and control versus taxes," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 28(3), pages 654-684, June.
    12. Enriqueta Aragonès & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2017. "Imperfectly Informed Voters And Strategic Extremism," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 58(2), pages 439-471, May.
    13. Karakas, Leyla D. & Mitra, Devashish, 2020. "Inequality, redistribution and the rise of outsider candidates," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 1-16.
    14. Rusche, Christian, 2011. "Does Delegation Help to Prevent Spiteful Behavior?," Ruhr Economic Papers 270, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    15. Pau Balart & Sabine Flamand & Oliver Gürtler & Orestis Troumpounis, 2018. "Sequential choice of sharing rules in collective contests," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 20(5), pages 703-724, October.
    16. Enriqueta Aragonès & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2022. "Ideological Consistency and Valence," Working Papers 1383, Barcelona School of Economics.
    17. Gallego, Maria & Schofield, Norman, 2017. "Modeling the effect of campaign advertising on US presidential elections when differences across states matter," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 160-181.
    18. Tomer Blumkin & Volker Grossmann, 2010. "May increased partisanship lead to convergence of parties’ policy platforms?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 145(3), pages 547-569, December.
    19. T. Guse & B. Hehenkamp, 2006. "The strategic advantage of interdependent preferences in rent-seeking contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 323-352, December.
    20. Dhritiman Gupta, 2020. "Prize sharing rules in collective contests: When does group size matter?," Discussion Papers 20-04, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    political processes; conflict; group contests; endogenous claims; intra-group heterogeneity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ubi:deawps:87. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Xisco Oliver (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/dauibes.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.