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Stackelberg Rent-Seeking

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Gao, Lei & Lu, Jingfeng & Wang, Zhewei, 2025. "Move orders in contests: Equilibria and winning chances," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 436-468.
  2. Philipp Denter & Dana Sisak, 2010. ""Who's the thief?": Asymmetric Information and the Creation of Property Rights," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2010 2010-27, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.
  3. Dijkstra, Bouwe R., 1998. "A two-stage rent-seeking contest for instrument choice and revenue division, applied to environmental policy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 281-301, May.
  4. Fabian Dietz & Stephan Eitel, 2025. "Endogenous Incumbency in Repeated Contests," Working Papers 243, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE).
  5. Wang, Zhewei & Zhou, Lixue, 2022. "Information disclosure in sequential (and simultaneous) contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
  6. Hurley, Terrance M. & Shogren, Jason F., 1998. "Effort levels in a Cournot Nash contest with asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 195-210, June.
  7. ISKAKOV, Mikhail & ISKAKOV, Alexey & ZAKHAROV, Alexey, 2014. "Equilibria in secure strategies in the Tullock contest," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2014010, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  8. Adarkwah Yaw Antwi & John Adams, 2003. "Rent-seeking Behaviour and its Economic Costs in Urban Land Transactions in Accra, Ghana," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 40(10), pages 2083-2098, September.
  9. Juan D. Montoro-Pons, 2013. "Regulator preferences and lobbying efforts in rent-seeking contests," Chapters, in: Francisco Cabrillo & Miguel A. Puchades-Navarro (ed.), Constitutional Economics and Public Institutions, chapter 14, pages 257-278, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  10. John Duggan & Jacque Gao, 2020. "Lobbying as a multidimensional tug of war," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(1), pages 141-166, January.
  11. Damianov, Damian S. & Peeters, Ronald, 2017. "On the disclosure of ticket sales in charitable lotteries," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 73-76.
  12. Toomas Hinnosaar, 2021. "Stackelberg Independence," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(1), pages 214-238, March.
  13. Nava Kahana & Doron Klunover, 2017. "Sequential Lottery Contests with Multiple Participants," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2017-02, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
  14. Levi-Tsedek, Netanel & Sela, Aner, 2019. "Sequential (one-against-all) contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 9-11.
  15. Klunover, Doron, 2018. "A note on rent dissipation in lottery contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 90-93.
  16. Brookins, Philip & Matros, Alexander & Tzachrista, Foteini, 2025. "Sequential contests with incomplete information: Theory and experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 229(C).
  17. Anthony Heyes & Catherine Liston-Heyes, 2005. "Economies of scope and scale in green advocacy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 423-436, September.
  18. Chen Cohen & Ishay Rabi & Aner Sela, 2023. "Optimal seedings in interdependent contests," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 328(2), pages 1263-1285, September.
  19. Richard Cothren & Ravi Radhakrishnan, 2018. "Productivity growth and welfare in a model of allocative inefficiency," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 123(3), pages 277-298, April.
  20. Grossmann, Martin, 2014. "Uncertain contest success function," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 134-148.
  21. Philipp Denter & Dana Sisak, 2015. "The fragility of deterrence in conflicts," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 27(1), pages 43-57, January.
  22. Sandra Ludwig, 2012. "Contests—a comparison of timing and information structures," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(3), pages 341-355, December.
  23. Romano, Richard & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2005. "On the endogeneity of Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria: games of accumulation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 120(1), pages 73-107, January.
  24. Karl W ärneryd, 2003. "Information in conflicts," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 487-502, Springer.
  25. Nelson, Arthur B, 2020. "Deterrence in sequential contests: An experimental study," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
  26. Skarzhinskaya, E. & Tzurikov, V., 2023. "The endogenous formation of leadership in collective actions using the modified timing decisions algorithm," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 51-68.
  27. D. Fiaschi & R. Orsini, 1998. "Long Run Growth and Income Distribution in an Olg Model With Strategic Job-Seeking and Credit Rationing," Working Papers 331, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  28. Konstantinos Protopappas, 2023. "Manipulation of moves in sequential contests," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(3), pages 511-535, October.
  29. Toomas Hinnosaar, 2016. "Dynamic common-value contests," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 479, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
  30. Ella Segev & Aner Sela, 2011. "Sequential All-Pay Auctions with Head Starts and Noisy Outputs," Working Papers 1106, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
  31. Guy L. F. Holburn & John W. Maxwell & Jean-Philippe Bonardi, 2024. "Safe Bets, Long Shots, and Toss-Ups: Strategic Engagements Between Activists and Firms," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 70(11), pages 7443-7462, November.
  32. M. Christian Lehmann, 2020. "Aiding refugees, aiding peace?," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(5), pages 1687-1704, September.
  33. de Roos, Nicolas & Matros, Alexander & Smirnov, Vladimir & Wait, Andrew, 2018. "Shipwrecks and treasure hunters," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 259-283.
  34. Hurley, Terrance M. & Shogren, Jason F., 1998. "Asymmetric information contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 645-665, November.
  35. Sebagh Thierry, 1995. "Recherche De Rente : Jeu de Guerre et Guerre D'enjeux - II," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 6(2-3), pages 301-320, June.
  36. Ella Segev & Aner Sela, 2014. "Sequential all-pay auctions with head starts," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(4), pages 893-923, December.
  37. Denis Claude & Mabel Tidball, 2026. "Revisiting Stackelberg in His Own Light: Conjecture Learning in Leader-Follower Games ," Post-Print hal-05571970, HAL.
  38. Christian Ewerhart & Julia Lareida, 2018. "Voluntary disclosure in asymmetric contests," ECON - Working Papers 279, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Jul 2023.
  39. Skarzhinskaya, E. & Tsurikov, V., 2021. "Endogenous Stackelberg leadership within a team. The coalition effect," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 49(1), pages 53-79.
  40. Dijkstra, Bouwe R., 1998. "Cooperation by way of support in a rent seeking contest for a public good," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 703-725, November.
  41. Chang, Yang-Ming & Sellak, Manaf, 2025. "Alliances and strategic advantage in sequential-move contests: Implications for offensive vs. defensive strategies," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 231(C).
  42. Hurley, Terrance M. & Shogren, Jason F., 1997. "Environmental Conflicts and the SLAPP," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 253-273, July.
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