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Sequential lottery contests with multiple participants

Author

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  • Kahana, Nava
  • Klunover, Doron

Abstract

We apply aggregative games techniques in a novel fashion in the analysis of sequential lottery contests with n players to show that, there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies.

Suggested Citation

  • Kahana, Nava & Klunover, Doron, 2018. "Sequential lottery contests with multiple participants," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 126-129.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:163:y:2018:i:c:p:126-129
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.12.010
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Robson, Arthur J, 1990. "Stackelberg and Marshall," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 69-82, March.
    2. Glazer, Amihai & Hassin, Refael, 2000. "Sequential Rent Seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 102(3-4), pages 219-228, March.
    3. Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2005. "Asymmetric contests with general technologies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(4), pages 923-946, November.
    4. Yildirim, Huseyin, 2005. "Contests with multiple rounds," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 213-227, April.
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    6. Cornes, Richard & Hartley, Roger, 2012. "Fully aggregative games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 631-633.
    7. Marco Serena, 2017. "Sequential contests revisited," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 173(1), pages 131-144, October.
    8. Morgan, John, 2003. "Sequential Contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 116(1-2), pages 1-18, July.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Hinnosaar, Toomas, 2024. "Optimal sequential contests," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(1), January.
    2. Stefano Barbieri & Marco Serena, 2020. "Fair Representation in Primaries: Heterogeneity and the New Hampshire Effect," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2020-07, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    3. Wang, Zhewei & Zhou, Lixue, 2022. "Information disclosure in sequential (and simultaneous) contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    4. Klunover, Doron, 2018. "A note on rent dissipation in lottery contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 90-93.
    5. Lu, Jingfeng & Lu, David, 2020. "Task arrangement in team competitions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
    6. Arthur B. Nelson & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2019. "Contests with sequential moves: An experimental study," Working Papers wp2019_11_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Aggregative games; Sequential contests; Subgame perfect equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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