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Fair Representation in Primaries: Heterogeneity and the New Hampshire Effect

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  • Stefano Barbieri
  • Marco Serena

Abstract

In sequential primaries, fair representation of the electorate may be undermined by the New Hampshire effect. Simultaneous primaries address fair representation, but may increase expenditures. We analyze these issues by studying heterogeneity in sequential and simultaneous contests. If a player is stronger in every battle (e.g., a candidate is favorite by the entire electorate), then expenditures are smaller in sequential than in simultaneous contests, as in the literature for homogeneous players, and the stronger player is more likely to win in sequential than simultaneous contests. However, if playersÂ’ advantages alternate across battles, then expenditures may be greater in sequential than in simultaneous contests, and the player who has the advantage later in sequential contest is more likely to win: dynamics affect representation. We interpret our results in light of the candidatesÂ’advantages due to statesÂ’ demographics in the 2020 US primaries and discuss novel testable implications of our analysis.

Suggested Citation

  • Stefano Barbieri & Marco Serena, 2020. "Fair Representation in Primaries: Heterogeneity and the New Hampshire Effect," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2020-07, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
  • Handle: RePEc:mpi:wpaper:tax-mpg-rps-2020-07
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    contests; momentum effect; temporal structures.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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