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Marco Serena

Personal Details

First Name:Marco
Middle Name:
Last Name:Serena
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pse563
https://sites.google.com/site/marcoserenaphd/
Terminal Degree:2016 Departamento de Economía; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Max-Planck-Institut für Steuerrecht und öffentliche Finanzen
Max-Planck-Gesellschaft

München, Germany
http://www.tax.mpg.de/
RePEc:edi:mptaxde (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles Chapters

Working papers

  1. Stefano Barbieri & Marco Serena, 2018. "Biasing Unbiased Dynamic Contests," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2018-06, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
  2. Marco Serena, 2018. "Successful Opaque Management," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2018-01_2, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
  3. Christos Mavridis & Marco Serena, 2018. "Complete Information Pivotal-Voter Model with Asymmetric Group Size," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2018-07, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
  4. Marco Serena, 2017. "Harnessing Beliefs to Stimulate Efforts; on the Optimal Disclosure Policy in Contests," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2018-11, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
  5. Luis C. Corchón & Marco Serena, 2016. "Properties of Contests," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2018-10, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
  6. Malin Arve & Marco Serena, 2016. "Level-k Models Rationalize Overspending in Contests," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2018-09, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.

Articles

  1. Marco Serena, 2019. "A Game-Free Microfoundation of Mutual Optimism," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 10(4), pages 1-14, September.
  2. Christos Mavridis & Marco Serena, 2018. "Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 177(1), pages 53-66, October.
  3. Serena, Marco, 2017. "Quality contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 15-25.
  4. Marco Serena, 2017. "Sequential contests revisited," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 173(1), pages 131-144, October.

Chapters

  1. Luis C. Corchón & Marco Serena, 2018. "Contest theory," Chapters, in: Luis C. Corchón & Marco A. Marini (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume II, chapter 6, pages 125-146, Edward Elgar Publishing.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Stefano Barbieri & Marco Serena, 2018. "Biasing Unbiased Dynamic Contests," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2018-06, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.

    Cited by:

    1. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve-Gonzalez & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2020. "Heterogeneity, Leveling the Playing Field, and Affirmative Action in Contests," Munich Papers in Political Economy 06, TUM School of Governance at the Technical University of Munich.
    2. Derek J. Clark & Tore Nilssen & Jan Yngve Sand, 2020. "Gaining advantage by winning contests," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 24(1), pages 23-38, June.

  2. Christos Mavridis & Marco Serena, 2018. "Complete Information Pivotal-Voter Model with Asymmetric Group Size," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2018-07, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.

    Cited by:

    1. Nöldeke, Georg & Peña, Jorge, 2020. "Group size and collective action in a binary contribution game," IAST Working Papers 18-86, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST).
    2. Mavridis, Christos & Serena, Marco, 2021. "Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size and asymmetric benefits," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    3. Müller, Michael & Puppe, Clemens, 2020. "Strategy-proofness and responsiveness imply minimal participation," Working Paper Series in Economics 138, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.

  3. Marco Serena, 2017. "Harnessing Beliefs to Stimulate Efforts; on the Optimal Disclosure Policy in Contests," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2018-11, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.

    Cited by:

    1. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve-Gonzalez & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2020. "Heterogeneity, Leveling the Playing Field, and Affirmative Action in Contests," Munich Papers in Political Economy 06, TUM School of Governance at the Technical University of Munich.

Articles

  1. Marco Serena, 2019. "A Game-Free Microfoundation of Mutual Optimism," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 10(4), pages 1-14, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Gabriele Gratton & Galina Zudenkova, 2020. "Introduction to the Special Issue Political Games: Strategy, Persuasion, and Learning," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 11(1), pages 1-2, February.

  2. Christos Mavridis & Marco Serena, 2018. "Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 177(1), pages 53-66, October.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Serena, Marco, 2017. "Quality contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 15-25.

    Cited by:

    1. Dahm, Matthias & Esteve-González, Patricia, 2018. "Affirmative action through extra prizes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 123-142.
    2. Amegashie, J. Atsu, 2019. "Quantity-cum-quality contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 289-297.
    3. Stefano Barbieri & Marco Serena, 2018. "Biasing Unbiased Dynamic Contests," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2018-06, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    4. Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2016. "Biased contests for symmetric players," MPRA Paper 75378, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Marco Serena, 2017. "Harnessing Beliefs to Stimulate Efforts; on the Optimal Disclosure Policy in Contests," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2018-11, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    6. Shanglyu Deng & Hanming Fang & Qiang Fu & Zenan Wu, 2020. "Confidence Management in Tournaments," NBER Working Papers 27186, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve-Gonzalez & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2020. "Heterogeneity, Leveling the Playing Field, and Affirmative Action in Contests," Munich Papers in Political Economy 06, TUM School of Governance at the Technical University of Munich.
    8. Dahm, Matthias, 2018. "Semi-targeted all-pay auctions: A partial exclusion principle," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 256-282.
    9. Chen, Bo, 2020. "Disclosure policies in research contests with stochastic entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    10. Marco Serena, 2017. "Sequential contests revisited," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 173(1), pages 131-144, October.
    11. Omri Haluta & Aner Sela, 2020. "Effort Maximization In Contests Under A Balance Constraint," Working Papers 2006, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    12. Fu, Qiang & Wu, Zenan, 0. "On the optimal design of biased contests," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    13. Derek J. Clark & Tore Nilssen & Jan Yngve Sand, 2020. "Gaining advantage by winning contests," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 24(1), pages 23-38, June.

  4. Marco Serena, 2017. "Sequential contests revisited," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 173(1), pages 131-144, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Nava Kahana & Doron Klunover, 2017. "Sequential Lottery Contests with Multiple Participants," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2017-02, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    2. Kahana, Nava & Klunover, Doron, 2018. "Sequential lottery contests with multiple participants," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 126-129.

Chapters

  1. Luis C. Corchón & Marco Serena, 2018. "Contest theory," Chapters, in: Luis C. Corchón & Marco A. Marini (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume II, chapter 6, pages 125-146, Edward Elgar Publishing.

    Cited by:

    1. Dahm, Matthias & Esteve-González, Patricia, 2018. "Affirmative action through extra prizes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 123-142.
    2. Kenan Huremovic, 2019. "A Noncooperative Model of Contest Network Formation," Papers 1901.07605, arXiv.org, revised May 2020.
    3. Ben Chen & José A. Rodrigues-Neto, 2017. "Cost Shifting in Civil Litigation: A General Theory," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2017-651, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
    4. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve-Gonzalez & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2020. "Heterogeneity, Leveling the Playing Field, and Affirmative Action in Contests," Munich Papers in Political Economy 06, TUM School of Governance at the Technical University of Munich.
    5. Jens Gudmundsson & Jens Leth Hougaard, 2020. "Enabling reciprocity through blockchain design," IFRO Working Paper 2020/14, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics, revised 09 Feb 2021.
    6. Doron Klunover & John Morgan, 2018. "A note on contests with a constrained choice set of effort," Papers 1809.04436, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2020.
    7. Johan N. M. Lagerlöf, 2020. "Hybrid All-Pay and Winner-Pay Contests," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 144-169, November.
    8. Christian Ewerhart & Guang-Zhen Sun, 2020. "The n-player Hirshleifer contest," ECON - Working Papers 361, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    9. Ginzburg, Boris, 2019. "A Simple Model of Competitive Testing," MPRA Paper 94605, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Doron Klunover, 2020. "Nice guys don't always finish last: succeeding in hierarchical organizations," Papers 2007.04435, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2020.
    11. Pau Balart & Agustin Casas & Orestis Troumpounis, 2019. "Technological change, campaign spending and polarization," Working Papers 269238020, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
    12. Dmitry B. Rokhlin & Anatoly Usov, 2017. "Asymptotic efficiency of the proportional compensation scheme for a large number of producers," Papers 1701.06038, arXiv.org.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 2 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (2) 2019-10-21 2019-10-21. Author is listed
  2. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 2019-10-21. Author is listed
  3. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (1) 2019-10-21. Author is listed
  4. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (1) 2019-10-21. Author is listed
  5. NEP-SPO: Sports & Economics (1) 2019-10-21. Author is listed

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