Marco Serena

Personal Details

First Name:	Marco
Middle Name:
Last Name:	Serena
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:	pse563
	[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
	https://sites.google.com/site/marcoserenaphd/
Terminal Degree:	2016 Departamento de Economía; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Max-Planck-Institut für Steuerrecht und öffentliche Finanzen
Max-Planck-Gesellschaft

München, Germany
http://www.tax.mpg.de/
RePEc:edi:mptaxde (more details at EDIRC)

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

1. Stefano Barbieri & Marco Serena, 2018. "Biasing Unbiased Dynamic Contests," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2018-06, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.

   Cited by:

   1. Malin Arve & Olga Chiappinelli, 2018. "The Role of Budget Contraints in Sequential Elimination Tournaments," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1777, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
      • Malin Arve & Olga Chiappinelli, 2021. "The Role of Budget Constraints in Sequential Elimination Tournaments," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 123(4), pages 1059-1087, October.
   2. Derek J. Clark & Tore Nilssen & Jan Yngve Sand, 2020. "Gaining advantage by winning contests," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 24(1), pages 23-38, June.
   3. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve-Gonzalez & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2020. "Heterogeneity, Leveling the Playing Field, and Affirmative Action in Contests," Munich Papers in Political Economy 06, Munich School of Politics and Public Policy and the School of Management at the Technical University of Munich.
      • Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve‐González & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2023. "Heterogeneity, leveling the playing field, and affirmative action in contests," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 89(3), pages 924-974, January.
      • Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve-González & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2020. "Heterogeneity, Leveling the Playing Field, and Affirmative Action in Contests," Economics Series Working Papers 915, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.

2. Christos Mavridis & Marco Serena, 2018. "Complete Information Pivotal-Voter Model with Asymmetric Group Size," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2018-07, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
   • Christos Mavridis & Marco Serena, 2018. "Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 177(1), pages 53-66, October.

   Cited by:

   1. Mavridis, Christos & Serena, Marco, 2021. "Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size and asymmetric benefits," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
   2. Michael Müller & Clemens Puppe, 2023. "Strategy-proofness implies minimal participation under single-peakedness," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(1), pages 131-151, April.
   3. Nöldeke, Georg & Peña, Jorge, 2020. "Group size and collective action in a binary contribution game," IAST Working Papers 18-86, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST).
      • Georg Nöldeke & Jorge Peña, 2020. "Group size and collective action in a binary contribution game," Post-Print hal-02923973, HAL.
      • Nöldeke, Georg & Peña, Jorge, 2020. "Group size and collective action in a binary contribution game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 42-51.
   4. Christos Mavridis & Marco Serena, 2019. "Complete Information Pivotal-Voter Model with Asymmetric Group Size and Asymmetric Beneï¬ ts," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2019-17_2, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
   5. Müller, Michael & Puppe, Clemens, 2020. "Strategy-proofness and responsiveness imply minimal participation," Working Paper Series in Economics 138, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.

3. Marco Serena, 2017. "Harnessing Beliefs to Stimulate Efforts; on the Optimal Disclosure Policy in Contests," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2018-11, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.

   Cited by:

   1. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve-Gonzalez & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2020. "Heterogeneity, Leveling the Playing Field, and Affirmative Action in Contests," Munich Papers in Political Economy 06, Munich School of Politics and Public Policy and the School of Management at the Technical University of Munich.
      • Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve‐González & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2023. "Heterogeneity, leveling the playing field, and affirmative action in contests," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 89(3), pages 924-974, January.
      • Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve-González & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2020. "Heterogeneity, Leveling the Playing Field, and Affirmative Action in Contests," Economics Series Working Papers 915, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.

Articles

1. Marco Serena, 2019. "A Game-Free Microfoundation of Mutual Optimism," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(4), pages 1-14, September.

   Cited by:

   1. Gabriele Gratton & Galina Zudenkova, 2020. "Introduction to the Special Issue Political Games: Strategy, Persuasion, and Learning," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(1), pages 1-2, February.

2. Christos Mavridis & Marco Serena, 2018. "Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 177(1), pages 53-66, October.
   • Christos Mavridis & Marco Serena, 2018. "Complete Information Pivotal-Voter Model with Asymmetric Group Size," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2018-07, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
   See citations under working paper version above.
3. Serena, Marco, 2017. "Quality contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 15-25.

   Cited by:

   1. Dahm, Matthias & Esteve-González, Patricia, 2018. "Affirmative action through extra prizes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 123-142.
      • Matthias Dahm & Patricia Esteve, 2014. "Affirmative Action through Extra Prizes," Discussion Papers 2014-08, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
      • Dahm, Matthias & Esteve, Patrícia,, 2013. "Affirmative Action through Extra Prizes," Working Papers 2072/222197, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
   2. Amegashie, J. Atsu, 2019. "Quantity-cum-quality contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 289-297.
      • J. Atsu Amegashie, 2018. "Quantity-cum-Quality Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 7110, CESifo.
   3. Jonas Send, 2021. "Contest Copycats: Adversarial Duplication of Effort in Contests," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2021-17, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
   4. Chen, Bo, 2020. "Disclosure policies in research contests with stochastic entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
   5. Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2017. "Biased contests for symmetric players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 116-144.
      • Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2016. "Biased contests for symmetric players," MPRA Paper 75378, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   6. Derek J. Clark & Tore Nilssen & Jan Yngve Sand, 2020. "Gaining advantage by winning contests," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 24(1), pages 23-38, June.
   7. Stefano Barbieri & Marco Serena, 2018. "Biasing Unbiased Dynamic Contests," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2018-06, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
   8. Marco Serena, 2017. "Harnessing Beliefs to Stimulate Efforts; on the Optimal Disclosure Policy in Contests," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2018-11, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
   9. Shanglyu Deng & Hanming Fang & Qiang Fu & Zenan Wu, 2020. "Confidence Management in Tournaments," NBER Working Papers 27186, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
   10. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve-Gonzalez & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2020. "Heterogeneity, Leveling the Playing Field, and Affirmative Action in Contests," Munich Papers in Political Economy 06, Munich School of Politics and Public Policy and the School of Management at the Technical University of Munich.
       • Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve‐González & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2023. "Heterogeneity, leveling the playing field, and affirmative action in contests," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 89(3), pages 924-974, January.
       • Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve-González & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2020. "Heterogeneity, Leveling the Playing Field, and Affirmative Action in Contests," Economics Series Working Papers 915, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
   11. Dahm, Matthias, 2018. "Semi-targeted all-pay auctions: A partial exclusion principle," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 256-282.
   12. Marco Serena, 2017. "Sequential contests revisited," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 173(1), pages 131-144, October.
   13. Omri Haluta & Aner Sela, 2020. "Effort Maximization In Contests Under A Balance Constraint," Working Papers 2006, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
   14. Fu, Qiang & Wu, Zenan, 2020. "On the optimal design of biased contests," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(4), November.

4. Marco Serena, 2017. "Sequential contests revisited," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 173(1), pages 131-144, October.

   Cited by:

   1. Hinnosaar, Toomas, 2024. "Optimal sequential contests," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(1), January.
      • Hinnosaar, Toomas, 2021. "Optimal Sequential Contests," CEPR Discussion Papers 15855, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   2. Wang, Zhewei & Zhou, Lixue, 2022. "Information disclosure in sequential (and simultaneous) contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
   3. Nava Kahana & Doron Klunover, 2017. "Sequential Lottery Contests with Multiple Participants," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2017-02, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
   4. Kahana, Nava & Klunover, Doron, 2018. "Sequential lottery contests with multiple participants," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 126-129.
   5. Konstantinos Protopappas, 2023. "Manipulation of moves in sequential contests," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(3), pages 511-535, October.

Chapters

1. Luis C. Corchón & Marco Serena, 2018. "Contest theory," Chapters, in: Luis C. Corchón & Marco A. Marini (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume II, chapter 6, pages 125-146, Edward Elgar Publishing.

   Cited by:

   1. Dahm, Matthias & Esteve-González, Patricia, 2018. "Affirmative action through extra prizes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 123-142.
      • Matthias Dahm & Patricia Esteve, 2014. "Affirmative Action through Extra Prizes," Discussion Papers 2014-08, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
      • Dahm, Matthias & Esteve, Patrícia,, 2013. "Affirmative Action through Extra Prizes," Working Papers 2072/222197, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
   2. Jens Gudmundsson & Jens Leth Hougaard, 2020. "Enabling reciprocity through blockchain design," IFRO Working Paper 2020/14, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics, revised 09 Feb 2021.
   3. Christian Ewerhart & Guang-Zhen Sun, 2020. "The n-player Hirshleifer contest," ECON - Working Papers 361, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Oct 2023.
   4. Ginzburg, Boris, 2019. "A Simple Model of Competitive Testing," MPRA Paper 94605, University Library of Munich, Germany.
      • Ginzburg, Boris, 2019. "A Simple Model of Competitive Testing," MPRA Paper 99463, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   5. Johan N. M. Lagerlöf, 2017. "Hybrid All-Pay and Winner-Pay Contests," Discussion Papers 17-20, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
      • Johan N. M. Lagerlöf, 2020. "Hybrid All-Pay and Winner-Pay Contests," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 144-169, November.
   6. Doron Klunover, 2020. "Nice guys don't always finish last: succeeding in hierarchical organizations," Papers 2007.04435, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2020.
   7. Kenan Huremovic, 2015. "A Noncooperative Model of Contest Network Formation," AMSE Working Papers 1521, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, revised Feb 2015.
      • Kenan Huremovic, 2016. "A Noncooperative Model of Contest Network Formation," Working Papers halshs-01154676, HAL.
      • Kenan Huremovic, 2019. "A Noncooperative Model of Contest Network Formation," Papers 1901.07605, arXiv.org, revised May 2020.
      • Kenan Huremović, 2021. "A noncooperative model of contest network formation," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(2), pages 275-317, April.
   8. Pau Balart & Agustin Casas & Orestis Troumpounis, 2019. "Technological change, campaign spending and polarization," Working Papers 269238020, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
      • Pau Balart & Agustín Casas & Orestis Troumpounis, 2022. "Technological Change, Campaign Spending and Polarization," Working Papers 105, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
      • Balart, Pau & Casas, Agustin & Troumpounis, Orestis, 2022. "Technological change, campaign spending and polarization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
   9. Dmitry B. Rokhlin & Anatoly Usov, 2017. "Asymptotic efficiency of the proportional compensation scheme for a large number of producers," Papers 1701.06038, arXiv.org.
   10. Ben Chen & José A. Rodrigues-Neto, 2017. "Cost Shifting in Civil Litigation: A General Theory," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2017-651, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
   11. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve-Gonzalez & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2020. "Heterogeneity, Leveling the Playing Field, and Affirmative Action in Contests," Munich Papers in Political Economy 06, Munich School of Politics and Public Policy and the School of Management at the Technical University of Munich.
       • Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve‐González & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2023. "Heterogeneity, leveling the playing field, and affirmative action in contests," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 89(3), pages 924-974, January.
       • Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve-González & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2020. "Heterogeneity, Leveling the Playing Field, and Affirmative Action in Contests," Economics Series Working Papers 915, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
   12. Doron Klunover & John Morgan, 2018. "A note on contests with a constrained choice set of effort," Papers 1809.04436, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2020.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 2 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.

1. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (2) 2019-10-21 2019-10-21. Author is listed
2. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 2019-10-21. Author is listed
3. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (1) 2019-10-21. Author is listed
4. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (1) 2019-10-21. Author is listed
5. NEP-SPO: Sports and Economics (1) 2019-10-21. Author is listed

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