Enabling reciprocity through blockchain design
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More about this item
Keywords
Blockchain; reciprocity; protocol design; Nash equilibrium;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DES-2020-12-21 (Economic Design)
- NEP-EXP-2020-12-21 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2020-12-21 (Game Theory)
- NEP-PAY-2020-12-21 (Payment Systems and Financial Technology)
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