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Information dependent games : Can common sense be common knowledge?

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  • Gilboa, Itzhak
  • Schmeidler, David

Abstract

This paper attempts to study the consistency of several basic game-theoretic axioms. Two by-products are the introduction of information-dependent games, and a formal treatment of the framework of game theoretic axioms. In this setup a version of the Surprise Test Paradox is used to prove that common sense cannot be common knowledge.
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Suggested Citation

  • Gilboa, Itzhak & Schmeidler, David, 1988. "Information dependent games : Can common sense be common knowledge?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 215-221.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:27:y:1988:i:3:p:215-221
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Quintas, Luis G., 1988. "Constructing bimatrix games with unique equilibrium points," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 61-72, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2009. "Dynamic psychological games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 1-35.
    2. Laurence Kranich & Joan Esteban, 2002. "A Theory of Endogenous Sentiments," Discussion Papers 02-11, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics.
    3. Marc Le Menestrel, 2003. "A one-shot Prisoners’ Dilemma with procedural utility," Economics Working Papers 819, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    4. J. Atsu Amegashie, 2006. "A psychological game with interdependent preference types," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000511, UCLA Department of Economics.
    5. J. Atsu Amegashie, 2006. "Intentions and Social Interactions," Working Papers 0602, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
    6. ATTANASI Giuseppe & NAGEL Rosemarie, 2008. "A Survey of Psychological Games: Theoretical Findings and Experimental Evidence," LERNA Working Papers 08.07.251, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
    7. repec:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:293-308 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December.
    9. J. Atsu Amegashie, 2006. "A Psychological Game with Interdependent Preference Types," CESifo Working Paper Series 1824, CESifo Group Munich.
    10. Itzhak Gilboa, 1993. "Can Free Choice Be Known?," Discussion Papers 1055, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    11. J. Atsu Amegashie, 2006. "Intentions and Social Interactions," CESifo Working Paper Series 1757, CESifo Group Munich.
    12. John Geanakoplos, 1996. "The Hangman's Paradox and Newcomb's Paradox as Psychological Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1128, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    13. Itzhak Gilboa, 1989. "A Note on the Consistency of Game Theory," Discussion Papers 847, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    14. Reiter, Stanley, 2001. " Interdependent Preferences and Groups of Agents," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 3(1), pages 27-67.
    15. Wynn C. Stirling & Teppo Felin, 2016. "Satisficing, preferences, and social interaction: a new perspective," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(2), pages 279-308, August.
    16. Iñarra García, María Elena & Laruelle, Annick & Zuazo Garín, Peio, 2012. "Games with perceptions," IKERLANAK Ikerlanak;2012-64, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.

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