Can Free Choice Be Known?
In this note we reconsider an argument, borrowed from causal decision theory, according to which rational and identical players should cooperate in a one-shot prisoner's dilemma. We argue that, regardless of how one views this type of reasoning, the example rpoints at a possible inconsistency in standard formulations of knowledge and decision. We suggest that when formalizing notions of "decision," "choice," and "rationality," care must be taken not to assume knowledge of one's own choice. Finally, the relationships to the classical problems of causal decision theory and of dterminism versus free will are briefly discussed.
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