Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backward Induction in Perfect Information Games
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|Date of creation:||1992|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Tel-Aviv University, The Sackler Institute of Economic Studies, Ramat Aviv 69 978 Tel-Aviv, Israel|
Web page: http://econ.tau.ac.il/
More information through EDIRC
- Antonio Quesada, 2002. "Belief system foundations of backward induction," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 393-403, December.
- Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring, "undated".
"Intersubjective Consistency Of Knowledge And Belief,"
Department of Economics
98-03, California Davis - Department of Economics.
- Giacomo Bonanno, 2003. "Intersubjective Consistency Of Knowledge And Belief," Working Papers 983, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Itzhak Gilboa, 1993. "Can Free Choice Be Known?," Discussion Papers 1055, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Andres Perea, 2010. "Backward Induction versus Forward Induction Reasoning," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 1(3), pages 1-21, July.
- Tore Ellingsen & Magnus Johannesson, 2004. "Is There a Hold-up Problem?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 106(3), pages 475-494, October.
- Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus, 2000. "Is There a Hold-up Problem?," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 357, Stockholm School of Economics.
- Samet, Dov, 1996. "Hypothetical Knowledge and Games with Perfect Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 230-251, December.
- Dov Samet, 1994. "Hypothetical Knowledge and Games with Perfect Information," Game Theory and Information 9408001, EconWPA, revised 17 Aug 1994.
- Vincent J. Vannetelbosch & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 2000. "The equivalence of the Dekel-Fudenberg iterative procedure and weakly perfect rationalizability," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 15(3), pages 677-687.
- HERINGS, P. J.-J. & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent J., 1998. "The equivalence of the Dekel-Fudenberg iterative procedure and weakly perfect rationalizability," CORE Discussion Papers 1998029, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Vincent J. Vannetelbosch, 1998. "The Equivalence of the Dekel-Fudenberg Iterative Procedure and Weakly Perfect Rationalizability," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1173, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Steven D. Levitt & John A. List & Sally E. Sadoff, 2011. "Checkmate: Exploring Backward Induction among Chess Players," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(2), pages 975-990, April.
- Steven D. Levitt & John A. List & Sally E. Sadoff, 2009. "Checkmate: Exploring Backward Induction Among Chess Players," NBER Working Papers 15610, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Steven Levitt & John List & Sally Sadoff, 2010. "Checkmate: Exploring backward induction among chess players," Artefactual Field Experiments 00081, The Field Experiments Website.
- repec:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:01:n:s0219198906000795 is not listed on IDEAS
- Andrés Perea, 2006. "Proper belief revision and rationalizability in dynamic games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(4), pages 529-559, November.
- Pierpaolo Battigalli, 2004. "Rationalization in Signaling Games: Theory and Applications," Working Papers 275, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- John Hillas & Elon Kohlberg, 1996. "Foundations of Strategic Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information 9606002, EconWPA, revised 18 Sep 1996.
- Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 1999. "Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 188-230, September.
- Pierpaolo Battigalli, "undated". "Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games," Working Papers 111, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Stuart, Harborne Jr., 1997. "Common Belief of Rationality in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 133-143, April.
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