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Reasoning about strategies and rational play in dynamic games

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  • Giacomo Bonanno

    (Department of Economics, University of California Davis)

Abstract

We discuss a number of conceptual issues that arise in attempting to capture, in dynamic games, the notion that there is "common understanding" among the players that they are all rational.

Suggested Citation

  • Giacomo Bonanno, 2011. "Reasoning about strategies and rational play in dynamic games," Working Papers 1111, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:cda:wpaper:11-11
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    File URL: http://wp.econ.ucdavis.edu/11-11.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Bonanno, Giacomo, 2014. "A doxastic behavioral characterization of generalized backward induction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 221-241.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Belief revision; common belief; counterfactual; dynamic game; model of a game; rationality;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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