Rationality and backward induction
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References listed on IDEAS
- Samet, Dov, 1996.
"Hypothetical Knowledge and Games with Perfect Information,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
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- Ponti, Giovanni, 2000.
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- Brañas Garza, Pablo & Espinosa Alejos, María Paz, 2010. "Unraveling Public Good Games: The Role of Priors," DFAEII Working Papers 2010-04, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.
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- Yun Wang, 2015. "Belief and Higher-Order Belief in the Centipede Games: Theory and Experiment," WISE Working Papers 2015-03-24, Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE), Xiamen University.
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