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Rationalization in Signaling Games: Theory and Applications

  • Pierpaolo Battigalli

Focusing on signaling games, I illustrate the relevance of the rationalizability approach for the analysis multistage games with incomplete information. I define a class of iterative solution procedures, featuring a notion of “forward induction”: the Receiver tries to explain the Sender’s message in a way which is consistent with the Sender’s strategic sophistication and certain given restrictions on beliefs. The approach is applied to some numerical examples and economic models. In a standard model with verifiable messages a full disclosure result is obtained. In a model of job market signaling the best separating equilibrium emerges as the unique rationalizable outcome only when the high and low types are sufficiently different. Otherwise, rationalizability only puts bounds on the education choices of different types.

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Paper provided by IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University in its series Working Papers with number 275.

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Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:igi:igierp:275
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  29. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2003. "Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 38-72, October.
  30. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2002. "Strong Belief and Forward Induction Reasoning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 356-391, October.
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