On 'Reputation' Refinements with Heterogeneous Beliefs
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- Cripps, Martin W. & Schmidt, Klaus M. & Thomas, Jonathan P., 1996.
"Reputation in Perturbed Repeated Games,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 387-410, May.
- Cripps,Martin & Scmidt,Klaus & Thomas,Jonathan, 1993. "Reputation in pertubed repeated games," Discussion Paper Serie A 410, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Cripps, Martin W. & Schmidt, Klaus M. & Thomas, Jonathan P., 1996. "Reputation in perturbed repeated games," Munich Reprints in Economics 20052, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
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