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Monotonicity and Rationalizability in Large Uniform Price and Double Auctions

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  • In-Koo Cho

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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Theory workshop papers with number 658612000000000076.

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Date of creation: 14 May 2004
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Handle: RePEc:cla:uclatw:658612000000000076
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.dklevine.com/

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  1. Robert Wilson, 1977. "A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 44(3), pages 511-518.
  2. Martin J Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2009. "A Course in Game Theory," Levine's Bibliography 814577000000000225, UCLA Department of Economics.
  3. Jacob K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 2000. "Efficiency in Auctions with Private and Common Values: An Experimental Study," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-045/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  4. Bali, Valentina & Jackson, Matthew, 2002. "Asymptotic Revenue Equivalence in Auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 161-176, September.
  5. In-Koo Cho, 1994. "Stationarity, Rationalizability and Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 61(2), pages 357-374.
  6. Eddie Dekel & Asher Wolinsky, 2001. "Rationalizable outcomes of large independent private-value first-price discrete auctions," Discussion Papers 1321, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  7. Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1999. "Asymptotic Efficiency for Discriminatory Private Value Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(3), pages 509-528.
  8. Tirole, Jean, 1982. "On the Possibility of Speculation under Rational Expectations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1163-81, September.
  9. Swinkels, Jeroen M, 2001. "Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(1), pages 37-68, January.
  10. Eric Maskin & John Riley, 2000. "Asymmetric Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(3), pages 413-438.
  11. Aldo Rustichini, 1992. "Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 995, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  12. Martin W Cripps & Jeroen M Swinkels, 2003. "Efficiency of Large Double Auctions," Levine's Working Paper Archive 666156000000000329, David K. Levine.
  13. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Marek Pycia & Marzena Rostek & Marek Weretka, 2014. "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 81(4), pages 1366-1400.
  14. Wolfgang Pesendorfer & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1995. "The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions," Discussion Papers 1147, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  15. Wolfgang Pesendorfer & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1996. "Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions," Discussion Papers 1168, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  16. Philip J. Reny & Shmuel Zamir, 2004. "On the Existence of Pure Strategy Monotone Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(4), pages 1105-1125, 07.
  17. Athey, S., 1997. "Sigle Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information," Working papers 97-11, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  18. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-50, July.
  19. Paul Milgrom & Nancy L.Stokey, 1979. "Information, Trade, and Common Knowledge," Discussion Papers 377R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  20. Matthew O. Jackson & Leo K. Simon & Jeroen M. Swinkels & William R. Zame, 2002. "Communication and Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games of Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(5), pages 1711-1740, September.
  21. Hayek, F. A., 1996. "Individualism and Economic Order," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226320939, April.
  22. Milgrom, Paul R, 1979. "A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 679-88, May.
  23. Mark A. Satterthwaite & Steven R. Williams, 1989. "The Rate of Convergence to Efficiency in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction as the Market Becomes Large," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(4), pages 477-498.
  24. Ilan Kremer, 2002. "Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1675-1682, July.
  25. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2003. "Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 38-72, October.
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Cited by:

  1. Pierpaolo Battigalli, 2006. "Rationalization In Signaling Games: Theory And Applications," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 8(01), pages 67-93.

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