On the Asymptotic Distribution of the Transaction Price in a Clock Model of a Multi-Unit, Oral, Ascending-Price Auction within the Common-Value Paradigm
Using a clock model of a multi-unit, oral, ascending-price auction, within the commonvalue paradigm, we analyse the asymptotic behaviour of the transaction price as the number of bidders gets large. We find that even though the transaction price is determined by a (potentially small) fraction of losing drop-out bids, that price converges in probability to the ex ante unknown, true value. Subsequently, we derive the asymptotic distribution of the transaction price. Finally, we apply our methods to data from an auction of taxi license plates held in Shenzhen, China.
|Date of creation:||Dec 2010|
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