On the informational inefficiency of discriminatory price auctions
We analyze bidding behavior in large discriminatory price auctions where the number of objects is a non-trivial proportion of the number of bidders. Bidders observe private signals that are affiliated with the common value. We show that the average price in the auction is biased downward from the expected value of the objects, even in the competitive limit. In particular, we show that conditional on relatively low signals, bidders bid the expected value of the objects conditional n their information and winning; while bids at higher signals flatten out and are below the expected value conditional on winning.
|Date of creation:||Jan 2004|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Journal of Economic Theory, V. 132, #1, (2007) pp. 507-517|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: 626 395-4065
Fax: 626 405-9841
Web page: http://www.hss.caltech.edu/ss
|Order Information:|| Postal: Working Paper Assistant, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 228-77, Caltech, Pasadena CA 91125|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Bali, Valentina & Jackson, Matthew, 2002. "Asymptotic Revenue Equivalence in Auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 161-176, September.
- Wilson, Robert, 1977. "A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(3), pages 511-18, October.
- Milgrom, Paul R, 1979. "A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 679-88, May.
- Wolfgang Pesendorfer & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1997.
"The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions,"
Econometric Society, vol. 65(6), pages 1247-1282, November.
- Wolfgang Pesendorfer & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1995. "The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions," Discussion Papers 1147, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982.
"A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding,"
Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
- Milgrom, Paul R, 1981. "Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(4), pages 921-43, June.
- Jackson, Matthew O. & Kremer, Ilan, 2004. "The relationship between the allocation of goods and a seller's revenue," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-4), pages 371-392, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:clt:sswopa:1191. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Victoria Mason)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.