IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ecm/emetrp/v69y2001i1p37-68.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions

Author

Listed:
  • Swinkels, Jeroen M

Abstract

We consider discriminatory and uniform price auctions for multiple identical units of a good. Players have private values, possibly asymmetrically distributed and for multiple units. Our setting allows for aggregate uncertainty about demand and supply. In this setting, equilibria generally will be inefficient. Despite this, we show that such auctions become arbitrarily close to efficient if they are "large," and use this to derive an asymptotic characterization of revenue and bidding behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Swinkels, Jeroen M, 2001. "Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(1), pages 37-68, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:69:y:2001:i:1:p:37-68
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gresik, Thomas A., 2001. "Rationing rules and European Central Bank auctions," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(6), pages 793-808, November.
    2. Gábor Virág, 2013. "First-price auctions with resale: the case of many bidders," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(1), pages 129-163, January.
    3. García, Diego & Urošević, Branko, 2013. "Noise and aggregation of information in large markets," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 526-549.
    4. Baisa, Brian, 2016. "Overbidding and inefficiencies in multi-unit Vickrey auctions for normal goods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 23-35.
    5. Ewerhart, Christian & Cassola, Nuno & Valla, Natacha, 2010. "Declining valuations and equilibrium bidding in central bank refinancing operations," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 30-43, January.
    6. Bali, Valentina & Jackson, Matthew, 2002. "Asymptotic Revenue Equivalence in Auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 161-176, September.
    7. Fuhito Kojima & Parag A. Pathak, 2009. "Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 608-627, June.
    8. In-Koo Cho, 2004. "Monotonicity and Rationalizability in Large Uniform Price and Double Auctions," Theory workshop papers 658612000000000076, UCLA Department of Economics.
    9. Bresky, Michal, 2013. "Revenue and efficiency in multi-unit uniform-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 205-217.
    10. Bodoh-Creed, Aaron, 2013. "Efficiency and information aggregation in large uniform-price auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2436-2466.
    11. Schummer, James, 2004. "Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 154-170, July.
    12. Akaichi, Faical & Nayga, Rodolfo M. & Gil, José M., 2014. "Demand reduction in multi-unit auctions with varying number of bidders and units," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 124(3), pages 443-445.
    13. Chen, Ning & Ghosh, Arpita & Lambert, Nicolas S., 2014. "Auctions for social lending: A theoretical analysis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 367-391.
    14. Aaron Bodoh-Creed & Brent Hickman, 2016. "College Assignment as a Large Contest," Working Papers 2016-27, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.
    15. Brett E Katzman, 2009. "Asymptotic properties of equilibrium in discriminatory and uniform price ipv multi-unit auctions," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(2), pages 834-846.
    16. Athey, Susan & Miller, David A., 2007. "Efficiency in repeated trade with hidden valuations," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 2(3), September.
    17. Bulut, Harun & Koray, Semih, 2008. "Competition and Regulation Via Supply and Demand Functions in Oligopolistic-Oligopsonistic Markets," Staff General Research Papers Archive 12930, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    18. Martin W. Cripps & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 2006. "Efficiency of Large Double Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(1), pages 47-92, January.
    19. Cassola, N. & Ewerhart , C. & Valla, N., 2006. "Declining Valuations and Equilibrium Bidding Central Bank Refinancing Operations," Working papers 151, Banque de France.
    20. Al-Najjar, Nabil I. & Smorodinsky, Rann, 2007. "The efficiency of competitive mechanisms under private information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 383-403, November.
    21. Chakraborty, Indranil & Shyamalkumar, Nariankadu D., 2014. "Revenue and efficiency ranking in large multi-unit and bundle auctions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 12-21.
    22. Back, Kerry & Zender, Jaime F., 2001. "Auctions of divisible goods with endogenous supply," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 29-34, October.
    23. Gadi Fibich & Arieh Gavious, 2010. "Large auctions with risk-averse bidders," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 39(3), pages 359-390, July.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:69:y:2001:i:1:p:37-68. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/essssea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.