Rationalizable Outcomes of Large Independent Private-Value First-Price Discrete Auctions
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- Dekel, E. & Wolinsky, A., 2000. "Rationalizable Outcomes of Large Independent Private-Value First-Price Discrete Auctions," Papers 00-13, Tel Aviv.
- Eddie Dekel & Asher Wolinsky, 2001. "Rationalizable outcomes of large independent private-value first-price discrete auctions," Discussion Papers 1321, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Eddie Dekel & Asher Wolinsky, 2000. "Rationalizable Outcomes of Large Independent Private-Value First Price Discrete Auctions," Discussion Papers 1308, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
References listed on IDEAS
- Pierpaolo Battigalli & Marciano Siniscalchi, "undated". "Rationalizable Bidding in General First-Price Auctions," Working Papers 190, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Guesnerie, Roger, 1992.
"An Exploration of the Eductive Justifications of the Rational-Expectations Hypothesis,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1254-1278, December.
- Guesnerie, R., 1989. "An Exploration of the Eductive Justifications of the Rational Expectations Hypotbesis," DELTA Working Papers 89-24, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
- Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2003. "Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 38-72, October.
- Battigalli, P., 1999. "Rationalizability in Incomplete Information Games," Economics Working Papers eco99/17, European University Institute.
Citations
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Cited by:
- Battigalli Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi Marciano, 2003.
"Rationalization and Incomplete Information,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-46, June.
- P. Battigalli & M. Siniscalchi, 2002. "Rationalization and Incomplete Information," Princeton Economic Theory Working Papers 9817a118e65062903de7c3577, David K. Levine.
- Pierpaolo Battigalli, 2006.
"Rationalization In Signaling Games: Theory And Applications,"
International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 8(01), pages 67-93.
- Pierpaolo Battigalli, 2004. "Rationalization in Signaling Games: Theory and Applications," Working Papers 275, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2013.
"Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction,"
Working Papers
055-2013, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1926, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin A. Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2014. "Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000898, David K. Levine.
- In-Koo Cho, 2004. "Monotonicity and Rationalizability in Large Uniform Price and Double Auctions," Theory workshop papers 658612000000000076, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Mass, Helene, 2018. "Strategies under strategic uncertainty," ZEW Discussion Papers 18-055, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2003. "Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 38-72, October.
- Harry J. Paarsch & Jacques Robert, 2003. "Testing Equilibrium Behaviour At First-Price, Sealed-Bid Auctions With Discrete Bid Increments," CIRANO Working Papers 2003s-32, CIRANO.
- Pierpaolo Battigalli & Marciano Siniscalchi, "undated". "Rationalizable Bidding in General First-Price Auctions," Working Papers 190, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
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More about this item
Keywords
AUCTIONS ; RATIONALIZATION ; EFFICIENCY;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
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