Rationalizable Outcomes of Large Independent Private-Value First Price Discrete Auctions
We consider discrete versions of independent, private-value, first-price auctions. We show for any fixed finite set of possible bids, if the number of participants is large enough, then the set of rationalizable bids involves all players bidding the highest bid that is lower than their private value.
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- Kim-Sau Chung & Jeffrey C. Ely, 2000. "Efficient and Dominance Solvable Auctions with Interdependent Valuations," Discussion Papers 1313, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Pierpaolo Battigalli & Marciano Siniscalchi, . "Rationalizable Bidding in General First-Price Auctions," Working Papers 190, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Guesnerie, Roger, 1992.
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- Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2003. "Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 38-72, October.
- Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-50, July.
- Battigalli, P., 1999. "Rationalizability in Incomplete Information Games," Economics Working Papers eco99/17, European University Institute.
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