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Expectations formation, sticky prices, and the ZLB

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  • Bersson, Betsy
  • Hürtgen, Patrick
  • Paustian, Matthias

Abstract

At the zero lower bound (ZLB), expectations about the future path of monetary or fiscal policy are crucial. We model expectations formation under level-k thinking, a form of bounded rationality introduced by García-Schmidt and Woodford (2019) and Farhi and Werning (2017), consistent with experimental evidence. This process does not lead to a number of puzzling features from rational expectations models, such as the forward guidance and the reversal puzzle, or implausible large fiscal multipliers. Optimal monetary policy at the ZLB under level-k thinking prescribes keeping the nominal rate lower for longer, but short-run macroeconomic stabilization is less powerful compared to rational expectations.

Suggested Citation

  • Bersson, Betsy & Hürtgen, Patrick & Paustian, Matthias, 2019. "Expectations formation, sticky prices, and the ZLB," Discussion Papers 34/2019, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:bubdps:342019
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    JEL classification:

    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles

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