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Expectational coordination in simple economic contexts

  • Roger Guesnerie


  • Pedro Jara-Moroni


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Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 47 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 205-246

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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:47:y:2011:i:2:p:205-246
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  1. P. Battigalli & M. Siniscalchi, 2002. "Rationalization and Incomplete Information," Princeton Economic Theory Working Papers 9817a118e65062903de7c3577, David K. Levine.
  2. Stéphane Gauthier, 2002. "Determinacy and Stability under Learning of Rational Expectations Equilibria," Post-Print hal-00731065, HAL.
  3. R. Guesnerie, 2002. "Anchoring Economic Predictions in Common Knowledge," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(2), pages 439-480, March.
  4. Costas Azariadis & Roger Guesnerie, 1986. "Sunspots and Cycles," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(5), pages 725-737.
  5. Sanford J Grossman & Joseph E Stiglitz, 1997. "On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1908, David K. Levine.
  6. Rath, Kali P, 1995. "Representation of Finite Action Large Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 23-35.
  7. Branch, William A. & Evans, George W., 2010. "Monetary Policy and Heterogeneous Expectations," SIRE Discussion Papers 2010-32, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
  8. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-50, July.
  9. Balder, Erik J., 2002. "A Unifying Pair of Cournot-Nash Equilibrium Existence Results," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 437-470, February.
  10. John K.-H. Quah & Bruno Strulovici, 2009. "Comparative Statics, Informativeness, and the Interval Dominance Order," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(6), pages 1949-1992, November.
  11. Chamley,Christophe P., 2004. "Rational Herds," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521824019.
  12. Vives, X., 1988. "Nash Equilibrium With Strategic Complementarities," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 107-88, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  13. Gabriel Desgranges & Maik Heinemann, 2004. "Strongly rational expectations equilibria with endogenous acquisition of information," Computing in Economics and Finance 2004 35, Society for Computational Economics.
  14. Rath, Kali P, 1992. "A Direct Proof of the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games with a Continuum of Players," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 427-33, July.
  15. M Ali Khan & Yeneng Sun, 2002. "Non-Cooperative Games with Many Players," Economics Working Paper Archive 482, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
  16. Mordecai Kurz & Maurizio Motolese, 2011. "Diverse beliefs and time variability of risk premia," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 293-335, June.
  17. Gabriel Desgranges, 2000. "CK-Equilibria and Informational Efficiency in a Competitive Economy," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1296, Econometric Society.
  18. Carlsson, H. & van Damme, E.E.C., 1993. "Global games and equilibrium selection," Other publications TiSEM 49a54f00-dcec-4fc1-9488-4, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  19. Jara-Moroni, Pedro, 2012. "Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 668-684.
  20. Stéphane Gauthier & Roger Guesnerie, 2005. "Comparing Expectational Stability Criteria in Dynamic Models: A Preparatory Overview," Post-Print hal-00731535, HAL.
  21. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00587863 is not listed on IDEAS
  22. D. B. Bernheim, 2010. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Levine's Working Paper Archive 514, David K. Levine.
  23. George Evans, 1985. "Expectational Stability and the Multiple Equilibria Problem in Linear Rational Expectations Models," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1217-1233.
  24. Ghosal, Sayantan, 2006. "Intertemporal coordination in two-period markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 11-35, December.
  25. William Branch & Bruce McGough, 2011. "Business cycle amplification with heterogeneous expectations," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 395-421, June.
  26. Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1978. "Asset Prices in an Exchange Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(6), pages 1429-45, November.
  27. Guilherme Carmona, 2009. "A remark on the measurability of large games," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 491-494, June.
  28. Chamley,Christophe P., 2004. "Rational Herds," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521530927.
  29. Stephen J. DeCanio, 1979. "Rational Expectations and Learning from Experience," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 93(1), pages 47-57.
  30. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-77, November.
  31. Christophe Chamley, 1999. "Coordinating Regime Switches," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(3), pages 869-905.
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