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Expectational coordination in simple economic contexts

  • Roger Guesnerie

    ()

  • Pedro Jara-Moroni

    ()

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-010-0556-8
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Article provided by Springer & Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 47 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 205-246

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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:47:y:2011:i:2:p:205-246
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springer.com

Web page: http://saet.uiowa.edu/

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Order Information: Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/199/PS2

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  1. M Ali Khan & Yeneng Sun, 2002. "Non-Cooperative Games with Many Players," Economics Working Paper Archive 482, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
  2. Christophe Chamley, 1999. "Coordinating Regime Switches," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(3), pages 869-905.
  3. George W. Evans & William A.Branch, 2010. "Monetary Policy and Heterogeneous Expectations," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2010-4, University of Oregon Economics Department.
  4. Mordecai Kurz & Maurizio Motolese, 2007. "Diverse Beliefs and Time Variability of Risk Premia," Discussion Papers 06-044, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  5. John K.-H. Quah & Bruno Strulovici, 2009. "Comparative Statics, Informativeness, and the Interval Dominance Order," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(6), pages 1949-1992, November.
  6. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-77, November.
  7. Costas Azariadis & Roger Guesnerie, 1986. "Sunspots and Cycles," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(5), pages 725-737.
  8. Chamley,Christophe P., 2004. "Rational Herds," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521530927, November.
  9. Gabriel Desgranges & Maik Heinemann, 2005. "Strongly rational expectations equilibria with endogenous acquisition of information," Working Paper Series in Economics 9, University of Lüneburg, Institute of Economics.
  10. R. Guesnerie, 2002. "Anchoring Economic Predictions in Common Knowledge," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(2), pages 439-480, March.
  11. Stéphane Gauthier & Roger Guesnerie, 2005. "Comparing Expectational Stability Criteria in Dynamic Models: A Preparatory Overview," Post-Print hal-00731535, HAL.
  12. Stéphane Gauthier, 2002. "Determinacy and Stability under Learning of Rational Expectations Equilibria," Post-Print hal-00731065, HAL.
  13. George Evans, 1985. "Expectational Stability and the Multiple Equilibria Problem in Linear Rational Expectations Models," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1217-1233.
  14. Grossman, Sanford J & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1980. "On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(3), pages 393-408, June.
  15. D. B. Bernheim, 2010. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000381, David K. Levine.
  16. Guilherme Carmona, 2009. "A remark on the measurability of large games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 39(3), pages 491-494, June.
  17. Battigalli Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi Marciano, 2003. "Rationalization and Incomplete Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-46, June.
  18. Vives, Xavier, 1990. "Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 305-321.
  19. Jara-Moroni, Pedro, 2012. "Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 668-684.
  20. Hans Carlsson & Eric van Damme, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001088, David K. Levine.
  21. Rath, Kali P, 1992. "A Direct Proof of the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games with a Continuum of Players," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 2(3), pages 427-33, July.
  22. Ghosal, Sayantan, 2006. "Intertemporal coordination in two-period markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 11-35, December.
  23. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-50, July.
  24. Rath, Kali P, 1995. "Representation of Finite Action Large Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 24(1), pages 23-35.
  25. Gabriel Desgranges, 2000. "CK-Equilibria and Informational Efficiency in a Competitive Economy," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1296, Econometric Society.
  26. Stephen J. DeCanio, 1979. "Rational Expectations and Learning from Experience," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 93(1), pages 47-57.
  27. Pedro Jara-Moroni, 2008. "Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players," Working Papers halshs-00587863, HAL.
  28. Balder, Erik J., 2002. "A Unifying Pair of Cournot-Nash Equilibrium Existence Results," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 437-470, February.
  29. Chamley,Christophe P., 2004. "Rational Herds," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521824019, November.
  30. Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1978. "Asset Prices in an Exchange Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(6), pages 1429-45, November.
  31. William Branch & Bruce McGough, 2011. "Business cycle amplification with heterogeneous expectations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 47(2), pages 395-421, June.
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