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Expectational coordination in simple economic contexts

  • Roger Guesnerie


  • Pedro Jara-Moroni


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Article provided by Springer & Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 47 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 205-246

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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:47:y:2011:i:2:p:205-246
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-010-0556-8
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  1. Battigalli Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi Marciano, 2003. "Rationalization and Incomplete Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-46, June.
  2. R. Guesnerie, 2002. "Anchoring Economic Predictions in Common Knowledge," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(2), pages 439-480, March.
  3. Gauthier, S., 1999. "Determinacy and Stability under Learning of Rational Expectations Equilibria," DELTA Working Papers 1999-22, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  4. Rath, Kali P, 1995. "Representation of Finite Action Large Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 24(1), pages 23-35.
  5. Gabriel Desgranges & Maik Heinemann, 2005. "Strongly rational expectations equilibria with endogenous acquisition of information," Working Paper Series in Economics 9, University of Lüneburg, Institute of Economics.
  6. John K.-H. Quah & Bruno Strulovici, 2007. "Comparative Statics, Informativeness, and the Interval Dominance Order," Economics Papers 2007-W04, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
  7. Jara-Moroni, Pedro, 2012. "Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 668-684.
  8. Chamley,Christophe P., 2004. "Rational Herds," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521530927, September.
  9. D. B. Bernheim, 2010. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Levine's Working Paper Archive 514, David K. Levine.
  10. William Branch & Bruce McGough, 2011. "Business cycle amplification with heterogeneous expectations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 47(2), pages 395-421, June.
  11. Mordecai Kurz & Maurizio Motolese, 2011. "Diverse beliefs and time variability of risk premia," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 47(2), pages 293-335, June.
  12. Christophe Chamley, 1999. "Coordinating Regime Switches," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(3), pages 869-905.
  13. Carlsson, H. & van Damme, E.E.C., 1990. "Global games and equilibrium selection," Discussion Paper 1990-52, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  14. Khan, A. & Sun, Y., 2000. "Non-Cooperative Games with Many Players," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications 2000.80, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
  15. Gabriel Desgranges, 2000. "CK-Equilibria and Informational Efficiency in a Competitive Economy," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1296, Econometric Society.
  16. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-77, November.
  17. Stephen J. DeCanio, 1979. "Rational Expectations and Learning from Experience," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 93(1), pages 47-57.
  18. George W. Evans & William A.Branch, 2010. "Monetary Policy and Heterogeneous Expectations," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2010-4, University of Oregon Economics Department.
  19. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-50, July.
  20. Ghosal, Sayantan, 2006. "Intertemporal coordination in two-period markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 11-35, December.
  21. Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1978. "Asset Prices in an Exchange Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(6), pages 1429-45, November.
  22. Guilherme Carmona, 2009. "A remark on the measurability of large games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 39(3), pages 491-494, June.
  23. Stéphane Gauthier & Roger Guesnerie, 2005. "Comparing Expectational Stability Criteria in Dynamic Models: A Preparatory Overview," Post-Print hal-00731535, HAL.
  24. Chamley,Christophe P., 2004. "Rational Herds," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521824019, September.
  25. Costas Azariadis & Roger Guesnerie, 1986. "Sunspots and Cycles," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(5), pages 725-737.
  26. Pedro Jara-Moroni, 2008. "Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players," Working Papers halshs-00587863, HAL.
  27. Grossman, Sanford J & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1980. "On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(3), pages 393-408, June.
  28. Vives, Xavier, 1990. "Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 305-321.
  29. Rath, Kali P, 1992. "A Direct Proof of the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games with a Continuum of Players," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 2(3), pages 427-33, July.
  30. George Evans, 1985. "Expectational Stability and the Multiple Equilibria Problem in Linear Rational Expectations Models," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1217-1233.
  31. Balder, Erik J., 2002. "A Unifying Pair of Cournot-Nash Equilibrium Existence Results," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 437-470, February.
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