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Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal equilibria in non-atomic games

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  • Fu, Haifeng
  • Yu, Haomiao

Abstract

This paper makes the observation that a finite Bayesian game with diffused and disparate private information can be conceived of as a large game with a non-atomic continuum of players. By using this observation as its methodological point of departure, it shows that (i) a Bayes–Nash equilibrium (BNE) exists in a finite Bayesian game with private information if and only if a Nash equilibrium exists in the induced large game, and (ii) both Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal BNE exist in finite Bayesian games with private information. In particular, it shows these results to be a direct consequence of results for a version of a large game re-modeled for situations where different players may have different action sets.

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  • Fu, Haifeng & Yu, Haomiao, 2015. "Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal equilibria in non-atomic games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 7-15.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:58:y:2015:i:c:p:7-15
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.02.001
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    Cited by:

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    3. Fu, Haifeng, 2021. "On the existence of Pareto undominated mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in normal-form games with infinite actions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
    4. Fang, Chuyi & Wu, Bin, 2019. "Socially-maximal Nash equilibrium distributions in large distributional games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 40-42.
    5. Sun, Xiang & Zeng, Yishu, 2020. "Perfect and proper equilibria in large games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 288-308.
    6. Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli, 2016. "Strict Nash equilibria in non-atomic games with strict single crossing in players (or types) and actions," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 4(1), pages 95-109, April.

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