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Non-Cooperative Games with Many Players


  • Khan, A.
  • Sun, Y.


In this survey article, we report results on the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in games with an atomless continuum of players, each with an action set that is not necessarily finite. We also discuss purification and symmetrization of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria, and settings in which private information, anonymity and idiosyncratic shocks are given particular prominence.

Suggested Citation

  • Khan, A. & Sun, Y., 2000. "Non-Cooperative Games with Many Players," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications 2000.80, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
  • Handle: RePEc:fth:pariem:2000.80

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Cornet, B., 1984. "Existence of equilibria in economies with increasing returns," CORE Discussion Papers 1984007, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    2. Moriguchi, Chiaki, 1996. "Two-part marginal cost pricing in a pure fixed cost economy," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 363-385.
    3. Bonnisseau, Jean-Marc & Cornet, Bernard, 1988. "Existence of equilibria when firms follow bounded losses pricing rules," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2-3), pages 119-147, April.
    4. Guesnerie, Roger, 1975. "Pareto Optimality in Non-Convex Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(1), pages 1-29, January.
    5. Kamiya, Kazuya, 1988. "On the survival assumption in marginal (cost) pricing," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2-3), pages 261-273, April.
    6. Beato, Paulina & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1985. "On marginal cost pricing with given tax-subsidy rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 356-365, December.
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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other


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