Non-Cooperative Games with Many Players
In this survey article, we report results on the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in games with an atomless continuum of players, each with an action set that is not necessarily finite. We also discuss purification and symmetrization of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria, and settings in which private information, anonymity and idiosyncratic shocks are given particular prominence.
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|Date of creation:||2000|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: France; Universite de Paris I - Pantheon- Sorbonne, 12 Place de Pantheon-75005 Paris, France|
Phone: + 33 44 07 81 00
Fax: + 33 1 44 07 83 01
Web page: http://cermsem.univ-paris1.fr/
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