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Coordination on saddle-path solutions: the eductive viewpoint--linear multivariate models

Author

Listed:
  • Roger Guesnerie

    (DELTA - Département et Laboratoire d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Collège de France - Chaire Théorie économique et organisation sociale - CdF (institution) - Collège de France)

  • George W. Evans

    (Department of Economics - University of Oregon [Eugene])

Abstract

We examine local strong rationality (LSR) in multivariate models with both forward-looking expectations and predetermined variables. Given hypothetical common knowledge restrictions that the dynamics will be close to those of a specified minimal state variable solution, we obtain eductive stability conditions for the solution to be LSR. In the saddlepoint stable case the saddle-path solution is LSR provided the model is structurally homogeneous across agents. However, the eductive stability conditions are strictly more demanding when heterogeneity is present, as can be expected in multisectoral models. Heterogeneity is thus a potentially important source of instability even in the saddlepoint stable case.

Suggested Citation

  • Roger Guesnerie & George W. Evans, 2005. "Coordination on saddle-path solutions: the eductive viewpoint--linear multivariate models," Post-Print halshs-00754056, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00754056
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2004.06.010
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    Cited by:

    1. Parke, William R. & Waters, George A., 2014. "On The Evolutionary Stability Of Rational Expectations," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(7), pages 1581-1606, October.
    2. Bao, Te & Dai, Yun & Duffy, John, 2025. "Least squares learning? Evidence from the laboratory," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 172(C).
    3. Yuting Bai & Tatiana Kirsanova, 2013. "Infrequent Fiscal Stabilization," Working Papers 2013_01, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    4. Cho, In-Koo, 2005. "Introduction to learning and bounded rationality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 124(2), pages 127-128, October.
    5. Colucci, Domenico & Valori, Vincenzo, 2011. "Adaptive expectations and cobweb phenomena: Does heterogeneity matter?," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 35(8), pages 1307-1321, August.
    6. Gaballo, Gaetano, 2013. "Eductive learning and the rationalizability of oligopoly games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(3), pages 401-404.
    7. Richard Dennis & Tatiana Kirsanova, 2010. "Expectations traps and coordination failures: selecting among multiple discretionary equilibria," Working Paper Series 2010-02, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    8. Jara-Moroni, Pedro, 2012. "Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 668-684.
    9. Harvey Gram & G. C. Harcourt, 2017. "Joan Robinson and MIT," History of Political Economy, Duke University Press, vol. 49(3), pages 437-450, September.
    10. Domenico Colucci & Vincenzo Valori, 2009. "Heterogeneous adaptive expectations and cobweb phenomena," Working Papers - Mathematical Economics 2009-01, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
    11. George W Evans & Roger Guesnerie & Bruce McGough, 2019. "Eductive Stability in Real Business Cycle Models," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 129(618), pages 821-852.
    12. McClung, Nigel, 2020. "E-stability vis-à-vis determinacy in regime-switching models," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 121(C).
    13. Richard Dennis & Tatiana Kirsanova, 2013. "Expectations Traps and Coordination Failures with Discretionary Policymaking," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2013-611, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
    14. Roger Guesnerie, 2009. "Macroeconomic and Monetary Policies from the Eductive Viewpoint," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Carl E. Walsh & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Series (ed.),Monetary Policy under Uncertainty and Learning, edition 1, volume 13, chapter 6, pages 171-202, Central Bank of Chile.
    15. Roger Guesnerie & Pedro Jara-Moroni, 2011. "Expectational coordination in simple economic contexts," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 47(2), pages 205-246, June.
    16. Roger Guesnerie & Pedro Jara-Moroni, 2009. "Expectational coordination in simple economic contexts: concepts and analysis with emphasis on strategic substitutabilities," PSE Working Papers halshs-00574957, HAL.
    17. Mordecai Kurz, 2011. "Symposium: on the role of market belief in economic dynamics, an introduction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 47(2), pages 189-204, June.
    18. Gliksberg, Baruch, 2010. "The Role of Consumption-Labor Complementarity as a Source of Macroeconomic Instability," MPRA Paper 24816, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Martin Guzman & Joseph E Stiglitz, 2020. "Towards a dynamic disequilibrium theory with randomness," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 36(3), pages 621-674.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium

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