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On the Evolutionary Stability of Rational Expectations

  • William R. Parke

    ()

    (Department of Economics, University of North Carolina)

  • George A. Waters

    ()

    (Department of Economics, Illinois State University)

Evolutionary game theory provides a fresh perspective on the prospects that agents with heterogeneous expectations might eventually come to agree on a single expectation corresponding to the efficient markets hypothesis. We establish conditions where agreement on a unique forecast is stable, but also show that persistent heterogeneous expectations can arise if those conditions do not hold. The critical element is the degree of curvature in payoff weighting functions agents use to value forecasting performance. We illustrate our results in the context of an asset pricing model where a martingale solution competes with the fundamental solution for agents’ attention.

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File URL: http://economics.illinoisstate.edu/RePec/Papers/OESRE7-11.pdf
File Function: First version, 2011
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Illinois State University, Department of Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 20111002.

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Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ils:wpaper:20111002
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://economics.illinoisstate.edu

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  1. Brock, W.A. & Hommes, C.H. & Wagener, F.O.O., 2001. "Evolutionary Dynamics in Financial Markets With Many Trader Types," CeNDEF Working Papers 01-01, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance.
  2. Ulrich Horst & Jan Wenzelburger, 2008. "On non-ergodic asset prices," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 207-234, February.
  3. George W. Evans & Seppo Honkapohja & Noah Williams, 2005. "Generalized Stochastic Gradient Learning," NBER Technical Working Papers 0317, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Brock, W.A. & Hommes, C.H., 1996. "A Rational Route to Randomness," Working papers 9530r, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  5. Charemza, Wojciech W. & Deadman, Derek F., 1995. "Speculative bubbles with stochastic explosive roots: The failure of unit root testing," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 153-163, June.
  6. Bennett T. McCallum, 1981. "On Non-Uniqueness in Rational Expectations Models: An Attempt at Perspective," NBER Working Papers 0684, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Wiliam Branch & George W. Evans, 2005. "Model Uncertainty and Endogenous Volatility," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2005-21, University of Oregon Economics Department, revised 26 Oct 2006.
  8. Timmermann, Allan, 1994. "Present value models with feedback : Solutions, stability, bubbles, and some empirical evidence," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 1093-1119, November.
  9. George W. Evans & Roger Guesnerie, 1999. "Coordination on saddle path solutions: the eductive viewpoint," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2001-7, University of Oregon Economics Department, revised 15 May 2001.
  10. Blume, Lawrence & Easley, David, 1992. "Evolution and market behavior," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 9-40, October.
  11. C. H. Hommes, 2001. "Financial markets as nonlinear adaptive evolutionary systems," Quantitative Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 1(1), pages 149-167.
  12. Evans, George W, 1991. "Pitfalls in Testing for Explosive Bubbles in Asset Prices," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 922-30, September.
  13. Marcet, Albert & Sargent, Thomas J., 1989. "Convergence of least squares learning mechanisms in self-referential linear stochastic models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 337-368, August.
  14. Brock, William A. & Hommes, Cars H., 1998. "Heterogeneous beliefs and routes to chaos in a simple asset pricing model," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 22(8-9), pages 1235-1274, August.
  15. Parke, William R. & Waters, George A., 2007. "An evolutionary game theory explanation of ARCH effects," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(7), pages 2234-2262, July.
  16. Hofbauer, Josef & Weibull, Jîrgen W., 1995. "Evolutionary selection against dominated strategies," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9506, CEPREMAP.
  17. Waters, George A., 2009. "Chaos in the cobweb model with a new learning dynamic," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(6), pages 1201-1216, June.
  18. Eran A. Guse, 2008. "Heterogeneous Expectations, Adaptive Learning, and Evolutionary Dynamics," Working Papers 09-01, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
  19. Branch William & McGough Bruce, 2004. "Multiple Equilibria in Heterogeneous Expectations Models," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 1-16, December.
  20. Marcet, Albert & Sargent, Thomas J, 1989. "Convergence of Least-Squares Learning in Environments with Hidden State Variables and Private Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1306-22, December.
  21. Branch, William A. & McGough, Bruce, 2008. "Replicator dynamics in a Cobweb model with rationally heterogeneous expectations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 224-244, February.
  22. Constantinides, George M & Duffie, Darrell, 1996. "Asset Pricing with Heterogeneous Consumers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(2), pages 219-40, April.
  23. repec:dgr:uvatin:20010014 is not listed on IDEAS
  24. Gale, John & Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1995. "Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 56-90.
  25. Follmer, Hans & Horst, Ulrich & Kirman, Alan, 2005. "Equilibria in financial markets with heterogeneous agents: a probabilistic perspective," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1-2), pages 123-155, February.
  26. Sethi, Rajiv & Franke, Reiner, 1995. "Behavioural Heterogeneity under Evolutionary Pressure: Macroeconomic Implications of Costly Optimisation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(430), pages 583-600, May.
  27. repec:dgr:uvatin:20050056 is not listed on IDEAS
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