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Reputation in Repeated Games with No Discounting

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  • Watson, Joel

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  • Watson, Joel, 1996. "Reputation in Repeated Games with No Discounting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 82-109, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:15:y:1996:i:1:p:82-109
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:01:n:s0219198906000795 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Pierpaolo Battigalli, 2006. "Rationalization In Signaling Games: Theory And Applications," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 8(01), pages 67-93.
    3. Hausken, Kjell, 2007. "Reputation, incomplete information, and differences in patience in repeated games with multiple equilibria," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 138-144, November.
    4. D. Abreu & D. Pearce, 2000. "Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00f2, Economics Department, Princeton University.
    5. Sandroni, Alvaro, 2000. "Reciprocity and Cooperation in Repeated Coordination Games: The Principled-Player Approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 157-182, August.
    6. Dilip Abreu & David G. Pearce, 2006. "Reputational Wars of Attrition with Complex Bargaining Postures," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001218, David K. Levine.
    7. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 2003. "Rationalizability in infinite, dynamic games with incomplete information," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 1-38, March.
    8. Sorin, Sylvain, 1999. "Merging, Reputation, and Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 274-308, October.

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