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Interim Rationalizability


  • Eddie Dekel
  • Drew Fudenberg
  • Stephen Morris


This paper proposes the solution concept of interim rationalizability, and shows that all type spaces that have the same hierarchies of beliefs have the same set of interim rationalizable outcomes. This solution concept characterizes common knowledge of rationality in the universal type space.

Suggested Citation

  • Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Interim Rationalizability," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2064, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:fth:harver:2064

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Aumann, Robert J, 1987. "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 1-18, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Wolfgang Pesendorfer & Faruk Gul, 2007. "The Canonical Space for Behavioral Types," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000345, UCLA Department of Economics.
    2. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Morris, Stephen, 2006. "Topologies on types," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(3), pages 275-309, September.
    3. repec:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:01:n:s0219198906000795 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Françoise Forges, 2006. "Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information Revisited," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 61(4), pages 329-344, December.
    5. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1519, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    6. Pierpaolo Battigalli, 2006. "Rationalization In Signaling Games: Theory And Applications," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 8(01), pages 67-93.

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