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Community-Based Reasoning in Games: Salience, Rule-Following, and Counterfactuals

Author

Listed:
  • Cyril Hédoin

    (REGARDS - Recherches en Économie Gestion AgroRessources Durabilité Santé- EA 6292 - URCA - Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne - MSH-URCA - Maison des Sciences Humaines de Champagne-Ardenne - URCA - Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne)

Abstract

This paper develops a game-theoretic and epistemic account of a peculiar mode of practical reasoning that sustains focal points but also more general forms of rule-following behavior which I call community-based reasoning (CBR). It emphasizes the importance of counterfactuals in strategic interactions. In particular, the existence of rules does not reduce to observable behavioral patterns but also encompasses a range of counterfactual beliefs and behaviors. This feature was already at the core of Wittgenstein's philosophical account of rule-following. On this basis, I consider the possibility that CBR may provide a rational basis for cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma.

Suggested Citation

  • Cyril Hédoin, 2016. "Community-Based Reasoning in Games: Salience, Rule-Following, and Counterfactuals," Post-Print hal-02865620, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02865620
    DOI: 10.3390/g7040036
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    Cited by:

    1. Paul Weirich, 2017. "Epistemic Game Theory and Logic: Introduction," Games, MDPI, vol. 8(2), pages 1-3, March.
    2. Vartika Singh & Veeraruna Kavitha, 2024. "Stochastic Vaccination Game Among Influencers, Leader and Public," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 14(5), pages 1268-1316, November.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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