IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/ratsoc/v24y2012i1p106-128.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Game theory and the kula

Author

Listed:
  • Louis Corriveau

Abstract

The paper expounds a non-cooperative game that can be interpreted as a model of the system of kula that was described by Bronislaw Malinowski in his Argonauts of the Western Pacific . The game of kula is an infinite-horizon game with an arbitrary, but fixed, number n of players. It generates pure norms of direct reciprocity, pure norms of indirect reciprocity, and mixed norms whereby a player who deviates is punished both by the individual who has been harmed and by a third party.

Suggested Citation

  • Louis Corriveau, 2012. "Game theory and the kula," Rationality and Society, , vol. 24(1), pages 106-128, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:24:y:2012:i:1:p:106-128
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463111434700
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1043463111434700
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/1043463111434700?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. James W. Friedman, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 38(1), pages 1-12.
    2. Ken Binmore, 1998. "Game Theory and the Social Contract - Vol. 2: Just Playing," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 2, number 0262024446, December.
    3. Greif,Avner, 2006. "Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521671347, Enero-Abr.
    4. Ken Binmore, 1994. "Game Theory and the Social Contract, Volume 1: Playing Fair," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262023636, December.
    5. James W. Friedman, 1973. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames: A Correction," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 40(3), pages 435-435.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Giuseppe Danese & Luigi Mittone, 2015. "Norms and trades: An experimental investigation," Rationality and Society, , vol. 27(3), pages 259-282, August.
    2. Georg Kanitsar, 2021. "Self-Governance in Generalized Exchange. A Laboratory Experiment on the Structural Embeddedness of Peer Punishment," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(2), pages 1-16, June.
    3. Giuseppe Danese & Luigi Mittone, 2018. "The Circulation of Worthless Tokens Aids Cooperation: An Experiment Inspired by the Kula," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(3), pages 1-20, September.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Brian Skyrms, 2022. "The Social Contract, the Game of Life and the Shadow of the Future," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 117-125, December.
    2. Matthijs van Veelen, 2002. "Altruism, Fairness and Evolution: the Case for Repeated Stochastic Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 02-111/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    3. Larry Samuelson, 2016. "Game Theory in Economics and Beyond," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 30(4), pages 107-130, Fall.
    4. Thijssen, J.J.J., 2003. "Investment under uncertainty, market evolution and coalition spillovers in a game theoretic perspective," Other publications TiSEM 672073a6-492e-4621-8d4a-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    5. Peter Drysdale & Sébastien Willis, 2014. "International Institutions and the Rise of Asia," Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(3), pages 455-469, September.
    6. van der Heijden, Eline & Potters, Jan & Sefton, Martin, 2009. "Hierarchy and opportunism in teams," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 39-50, January.
    7. Matthijs van Veelen & Benjamin Allen & Moshe Hoffman & Burton Simon & Carl Veller, 2016. "Inclusive Fitness," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 16-055/I, Tinbergen Institute.
    8. Stanca, Luca, 2009. "Measuring indirect reciprocity: Whose back do we scratch?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 190-202, April.
    9. Pfeuffer, Wolfgang, 2006. "Religion as a Seed Crystal for Altruistic Cooperation," Munich Dissertations in Economics 5788, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    10. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2016. "Whither Game Theory?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000001307, David K. Levine.
    11. W. Bentley MacLeod & James M. Malcomson, 2023. "Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment: Thirty Years On," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 179(3-4), pages 470-499.
    12. Azis Iwan J, 2011. "Endogenous Institution in Decentralization," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 1-18, May.
    13. Louis Corriveau, 2018. "The constitution of patron–client relations and patronage appointments: a study of open and limited access," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 268-280, September.
    14. Ulf Liebe & Heidi Bruderer Enzler & Andreas Diekmann & Peter Preisendörfer, 2024. "One Justice for All? Social Dilemmas, Environmental Risks and Different Notions of Distributive Justice," Games, MDPI, vol. 15(4), pages 1-23, July.
    15. Kaplow, Louis & Shapiro, Carl, 2007. "Antitrust," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 15, pages 1073-1225, Elsevier.
    16. Motta, Massimo & Polo, Michele, 2003. "Leniency programs and cartel prosecution," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 347-379, March.
    17. Pierre-Pascal Gendron, 1996. "Corporation Tax Asymmetries: An Oligopolistic Supergame Analysis," Working Papers ecpap-96-04, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    18. Wong, Kit Pong, 2008. "Does market demand volatility facilitate collusion?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 696-703, July.
    19. Wright, Julian, 2013. "Punishment strategies in repeated games: Evidence from experimental markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 91-102.
    20. Helmuts Azacis & David R Collie, 2018. "Taxation and the sustainability of collusion: ad valorem versus specific taxes," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 125(2), pages 173-188, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:24:y:2012:i:1:p:106-128. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.