Information Dependent Games: Can Common Sense Be Common Knowledge?
This paper attempts to study the consistency of several basic game-theoretic axioms. Two by-products are the introduction of information-dependent games, and a formal treatment of the framework of game theoretic axioms. In this setup a version of the Surprise Test Paradox is used to prove that common sense cannot be common knowledge.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||1988|
|Publication status:||Published in Economics Letters, Elsevier, 1988, vol. 27, issue 3, pp. 215-221. <10.1016/0165-1765(88)90173-5>|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00753242|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|