A Theory of Endogenous Sentiments
We introduce a model in which agents' sentiments toward others are determined endogenously on the basis of how they perform relative to a standard of appropriate behavior. As sentiments change, so too does the optimal behavior of each individual, which in turn affects other agents' sentiments toward them. We focus on fixed points of this reciprocal adjustment process. To demonstrate the potential use and implications of such a model, we present an extended example involving team production. We consider various standards of behavior, and we examine stationary patterns of behavior and sentiments under each.
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|Date of creation:||2002|
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