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Préferences psychologiques et nouvelle économie politique

  • Antoine Billot

    (UP9 - Université Paris 9, Dauphine - Université Paris-Dauphine, PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC), PSE - Paris School of Economics)

  • Chantal Marlats

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

First, we present what is called the Theory of Psychological Preferences (altruism, rational reciprocity...) through, on one side, the list of axioms proposed by Sandbu (2008) for pure individual decisions and, on the other side, that of Segal and Sobel (2007) for strategical ones. Second, we characterize the potential relevance of such a theory to define a new "politicial economy" approach and we search to define the precise scope of this field of investigation in combining the micro'demands of the psychological preference theory with the standard macro'ones. Finally, we show that polycentered models seem to be the only framework within which individual psychological preference is an appropriate tool to study the collective impact of altruism, social loyalty, intrinsic reciprocity and so forth .

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Handle: RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00566146
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  1. Uzi Segal & Joel Sobel, 1999. "Tit for Tat: Foundations of Preferences for Reciprocity in Strategic Settings," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9905, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
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  16. Georg Kirchsteiger & Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, 1997. "Reciprocity as a contract enforcement device: experimental evidence," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/5911, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
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  20. Michael Kosfeld & Armin Falk, 2006. "The Hidden Costs of Control," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1611-1630, December.
  21. Uzi Segal & Joel Sobel, 2008. "A characterization of intrinsic reciprocity," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(3), pages 571-585, March.
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  26. Kahneman, Daniel & Knetsch, Jack L & Thaler, Richard H, 1986. "Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(4), pages S285-300, October.
  27. Axel Ockenfels & Gary E. Bolton, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March.
  28. Douglas D. Davis & Charles A. Holt, 1994. "Market Power and Mergers in Laboratory Markets with Posted Prices," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(3), pages 467-487, Autumn.
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