IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/att/wimass/20057.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Trust, reciprocity, and contract enforcement : experiments on satisfaction guaranteed

Author

Listed:
  • Andreoni,J.

    (University of Wisconsin-Madison, Social Systems Research Institute)

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Andreoni,J., 2005. "Trust, reciprocity, and contract enforcement : experiments on satisfaction guaranteed," Working papers 7, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  • Handle: RePEc:att:wimass:20057
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~andreoni/WorkingPapers/verify.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Andreoni, James & Brown, Paul M. & Vesterlund, Lise, 2002. "What Makes an Allocation Fair? Some Experimental Evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 1-24, July.
    2. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 97-109.
    3. Charness, Gary & haruvy, Ernan & Sonsino, Doron, 2001. "Social Distance and Reciprocity: The Internet vs. the Laboratory," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt3dt073wb, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
    4. Gneezy, Uri & Rustichini, Aldo, 2000. "A Fine is a Price," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, pages 1-17.
    5. Che, Yeon-Koo, 1996. "Customer Return Policies for Experience Goods," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(1), pages 17-24, March.
    6. Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2002. "Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, pages 817-869.
    7. Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., . "A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation," Chapters in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    8. Fehr, Ernst & Klein, Alexander & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2004. "Contracts, Fairness, and Incentives," Discussion Papers in Economics 334, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    9. Ernst Fehr & Georg Kirchsteiger & Arno Riedl, 1993. "Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 108(2), pages 437-459.
    10. Edward L. Glaeser & David I. Laibson & José A. Scheinkman & Christine L. Soutter, 2000. "Measuring Trust," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, pages 811-846.
      • Glaeser, Edward Ludwig & Laibson, David I. & Scheinkman, Jose A. & Soutter, Christine L., 2000. "Measuring Trust," Scholarly Articles 4481497, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    11. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter & Georg Kirchsteiger, 1997. "Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(4), pages 833-860, July.
    12. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, pages 817-868.
    13. John A. List, 2006. "The Behavioralist Meets the Market: Measuring Social Preferences and Reputation Effects in Actual Transactions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, pages 1-37.
    14. Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, 1997. "Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1251-1288.
    15. Martin Brown & Armin Falk & Ernst Fehr, 2004. "Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(3), pages 747-780, May.
    16. Romana Khan & Peter F. Orazem & Daniel M. Otto, 2001. "Deriving Empirical Definitions of Spatial Labor Markets: The Roles of Competing Versus Complementary Growth," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(4), pages 735-756.
    17. Fehr, Ernst, et al, 1998. "When Social Norms Overpower Competition: Gift Exchange in Experimental Labor Markets," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(2), pages 324-351, April.
    18. James Andreoni & William Harbaugh & Lise Vesterlund, 2003. "The Carrot or the Stick: Rewards, Punishments, and Cooperation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 893-902.
    19. Steven N. Durlauf, 2002. "On the Empirics of Social Capital," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(483), pages 459-479, November.
    20. Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 1281-1302.
    21. Mann, Duncan P & Wissink, Jennifer P, 1990. "Money-Back Warranties vs. Replacement Warranties: A Simple Comparison," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 432-436.
    22. Anke Kessler & Christoph Lülfesmann, 2004. "Bilateral bargaining, unverifiable quality, and options to return," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 395-410.
    23. Uri Gneezy, 2005. "Deception: The Role of Consequences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 384-394.
    24. Gary E Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, 1997. "A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1889, David K. Levine.
    25. Eckel, Catherine C. & Wilson, Rick K., 2004. "Is trust a risky decision?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 55(4), pages 447-465, December.
    26. repec:cup:apsrev:v:95:y:2001:i:01:p:131-144_00 is not listed on IDEAS
    27. Davies, Ronald B & Gresik, Thomas A, 2003. "Tax Competition and Foreign Capital," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, pages 127-145.
    28. Van Huyck John B. & Battalio Raymond C. & Walters Mary F., 1995. "Commitment versus Discretion in the Peasant-Dictator Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 143-170, July.
    29. Engle-Warnick, Jim & Slonim, Robert L., 2004. "The evolution of strategies in a repeated trust game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 55(4), pages 553-573, December.
    30. Berg Joyce & Dickhaut John & McCabe Kevin, 1995. "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 122-142, July.
    31. Bohnet, Iris & Frey, Bruno S. & Huck, Steffen, 2001. "More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 95(01), pages 131-144, March.
    32. Andreoni,J. & Castillo,M. & Petrie,R., 2000. "What do bargainers' preferences look like? : exploring a convex ultimatum game," Working papers 25, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Maroš Servátka & Steven Tucker & Radovan Vadovic, 2008. "Words Speak Louder Than Money," Working Papers in Economics 08/18, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance.
    2. Michael R. Veall, 2012. "Top income shares in Canada: recent trends and policy implications," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, pages 1247-1272.
    3. Jim Engle-Warnick & Andreas Leibbrandt, 2006. "Who Gets The Last Word? An Experimental Study Of The Effect Of A Peer Review Process On The Expression Of Social Norms," Departmental Working Papers 2006-11, McGill University, Department of Economics.
    4. Servátka, Maroš & Tucker, Steven & Vadovič, Radovan, 2011. "Words speak louder than money," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, pages 700-709.
    5. Belot, Michèle & Bhaskar, V. & van de Ven, Jeroen, 2010. "Promises and cooperation: Evidence from a TV game show," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(3), pages 396-405, March.
    6. Rigdon, Mary, 2009. "Trust and reciprocity in incentive contracting," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, pages 93-105.
    7. Antoine Billot & Chantal Marlats, 2009. "Préferences psychologiques et nouvelle économie politique," PSE Working Papers halshs-00566146, HAL.
    8. Marian Panganiban, 2015. "To friends everything, to strangers the law? An experiment on contract enforcement and group identity," Jena Economic Research Papers 2015-015, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    9. Maroš Servátka & Steven Tucker & Radovan Vadovic, 2009. "Building Trust One Gift at a Time," Working Papers in Economics 09/11, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance.
    10. Charness, Gary & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2010. "Bare promises: An experiment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 281-283, May.
    11. Cassar, Alessandra & Friedman, Daniel & Schneider, Patricia Higino, 2009. "Cheating in markets: A laboratory experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 240-259, October.
    12. Chia-lin Chang, 2011. "Risk management of risk under the Basel Accord: forecasting value-at-risk of VIX futures," Managerial Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 37(11), pages 1088-1106, September.
    13. Sophie Clot & Charlotte Stanton, 2014. "Present Bias in Payments for Ecosystem Services: Insights from a Behavioural Experiment in Uganda," Working Papers 14-03, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Jan 2014.
    14. Maroš Servátka & Steven Tucker & Radovan Vadovič, 2011. "Building Trust—One Gift at a Time," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 2(4), pages 1-22, September.
    15. Clot, Sophie & Stanton, Charlotte Y., 2014. "Present bias predicts participation in payments for environmental services: Evidence from a behavioral experiment in Uganda," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 162-170.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:att:wimass:20057. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ailsenne Sumwalt). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.