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Who Gets The Last Word? An Experimental Study Of The Effect Of A Peer Review Process On The Expression Of Social Norms

  • Jim Engle-Warnick

    ()

  • Andreas Leibbrandt

    ()

We alter who gets the last word on the outcome in three different types of trust games: the first mover the second mover, or, a committee comprised of first and second movers. The committee functions in a manner similar to a peer review process, in which experienced subjects pass judgment on the outcome reached by a different pair of subjects. Surprisingly, giving the first mover the last word benefits the second mover. Letting the committee decided increaes the first mover's trust. And first and second movers pass different types of judgments when they act as a committee. Length 29 pages

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Paper provided by McGill University, Department of Economics in its series Departmental Working Papers with number 2006-11.

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Date of creation: Sep 2006
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Handle: RePEc:mcl:mclwop:2006-11
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