Optimal Design of Peer Review and Self-Assessment Schemes
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- Baliga, Sandeep & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2001. "Optimal Design of Peer Review and Self-Assessment Schemes," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(1), pages 27-51, Spring.
- Sandeep Baliga, 2000. "Optimal Design of Peer Review and Self-Assessment Schemes," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1516, Econometric Society.
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- Johnson, Justin P., 2006. "Collaboration, peer review and open source software," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 477-497, November.
- Gromb, Denis & Martimort, David, 2007. "Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 271-299, November.
- Tamada, Yasunari & Tsai, Tsung-Sheng, 2014. "Delegating the decision-making authority to terminate a sequential project," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 178-194.
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- Alexander K. Koch & Julia Nafziger, 2012.
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- Jin‐Hyuk Kim, 2011. "Peer Performance Evaluation: Information Aggregation Approach," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(2), pages 565-587, June.
- Jonathan Treussard, 2005. "Life-Cycle Consumption Plans and Portfolio Policies in a Heath-Jarrow-Morton Economy," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2005-033, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Carrillo, Juan D., 2003. "Job assignments as a screening device," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(6), pages 881-905, June.
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