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L'analyse de l'influence de la pression des pairs dans les équipes de travail

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  • David Masclet

Abstract

This paper addresses the effects of peer pressure in work teams. Many empirical studies have shed light on the efficiency of peer pressure. Peer pressure can be defined as mechanisms of mutual monitoring and sanction established within a group of agents by the agents themselves in order to dissuade the members of the group from adopting a non-cooperative behavior. When work is organized in team production with profit sharing, theory predicts that compensing members of the team in proportion to the team's collective output provides a strong incentive to free ride on the efforts of others. However, because profits are shared, such structure also provide strong incentive to exert peer monitoring. Indeed a shirker do not reduce only his own payoff but also the payoff of every member of the team. We show in this paper that under some conditions, peer pressure increases cooperation. Cet article vise à étudier les conditions d'efficacité de la pression des pairs dans le cadre des équipes de travail. On définit la pression des pairs, comme l'ensemble de ces mécanismes de contrôle mais également de sanction mis en place par les agents eux-mêmes afin de discipliner leurs pairs. Lorsque le travail est organisé en équipe de production et qu'une partie du résultat est partagé entre les membres de l'équipe, chaque agent peut être incité à adopter un comportement de passager clandestin. Toutefois, alors que le partage des profits fournit aux agents des incitations fortes à adopter un comportement opportuniste, un tel mode de rémunération incite également au contrôle mutuel. En effet, le partage des profits peut inciter les agents à se contrôler mutuellement car la rémunération de chaque membre du groupe dépend non seulement de son propre effort mais également de celui des autres membres de l'équipe. On montre dans cet article que sous certaines conditions, la pression des pairs peut être une solution relative au problème du passager clandestin.

Suggested Citation

  • David Masclet, 2003. "L'analyse de l'influence de la pression des pairs dans les équipes de travail," CIRANO Working Papers 2003s-35, CIRANO.
  • Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2003s-35
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    peer pressure; peer monitoring; profit sharing; work incentives; free-riding; pression des pairs; contrôle mutuel; partage des profits; incitation à l'effort; passager clandestin;

    JEL classification:

    • D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
    • J2 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor
    • L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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