Voice and Loyalty as a Delegation of Authority: A Model and a Test on Matched Worker-Firm Panels
The authors model a mechanism that makes delegation of authority from a firm to a collective of workers profitable. Power is exchanged for loyalty. The model is tested using a matched panel of French workers and firms. For these firms, the authors know at two dates (1986 and 1992) whether a firm-level agreement has been signed. Furthermore, at these two dates and for each firm, a representative sample of the employees provides information on the individuals. The authors show both theoretically and empirically that the voluntary signature of such an agreement induces lower employee turnover given the structure of wages. Copyright 1997 by University of Chicago Press.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Farrell, Joseph & Gibbons, Robert, 1995. "Cheap Talk about Specific Investments," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 313-334, October.
- Crawford, Vincent P & Haller, Hans, 1990. "Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(3), pages 571-595, May.
- Nahum D. Melumad & Dilip Mookherjee & Stefan Reichelstein, 1995. "Hierarchical Decentralization of Incentive Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(4), pages 654-672, Winter.