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Monitoring Costs in Chinese Agricutural Teams

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  • Dong, Xiao-yuan
  • Dow, Gregory K

Abstract

Large productivity gains have been observed in Chinese agriculture following the transition from collective farming to household contracting. Using a model of mutual monitoring in an egalitarian production team, the authors estimate that labor supervision absorbed about 10-20 percent of total labor time for a sample of Chinese agricultural teams during 1970-76. These agency costs are lower than comparable estimates derived from aggregate data. Copyright 1993 by University of Chicago Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Dong, Xiao-yuan & Dow, Gregory K, 1993. "Monitoring Costs in Chinese Agricutural Teams," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(3), pages 539-553, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:101:y:1993:i:3:p:539-53
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    Cited by:

    1. Fertő, Imre, 2002. "A mezőgazdasági termelés szerkezetének változásai a fejlett országokban, I. Miért a családi gazdaság a meghatározó üzemforma a fejlett országok mezőgazdaságában?
      [Changes in the structure of agricu
      ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 574-596.
    2. Jeffery Carpenter & Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, 2006. "Mutual Monitoring in Teams: Theory and Experimental Evidence on the Importance of Reciprocity," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0608, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
    3. Carpenter, Jeffrey & Bowles, Samuel & Gintis, Herbert & Hwang, Sung-Ha, 2009. "Strong reciprocity and team production: Theory and evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 221-232, August.
    4. Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, 2002. "Social Capital and Community Governance," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(483), pages 419-436, November.
    5. Ferto, Imre & Fogarasi, Jozsef, 2005. "The Choice of Farm Organisation. A Hungarian Case," 94th Seminar, April 9-10, 2005, Ashford, UK 24420, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    6. Goeschl, Timo & Jarke, Johannes, 2016. "Second and third party punishment under costly monitoring," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 124-133.
    7. Zhang, Y., 2001. "Economics of transaction costs saving forestry," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 197-204, February.
    8. Li, Tianyou & Zhang, Junsen, 1998. "Returns to education under collective and household farming in China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 307-335, August.
    9. Tarik AKIN & Abbas MIRAKHOR, 2016. "Efficiency with Rule-Compliance: A Contribution to the Theory of the Firm in Islamic Economics," Journal of Economics and Political Economy, KSP Journals, vol. 3(3), pages 560-574, September.
    10. Goeschl, Timo & Jarke, Johannes, 2013. "Non-Strategic Punishment when Monitoring is Costly: Experimental Evidence on Differences between Second and Third Party Behavior," Working Papers 0545, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    11. Shengmin Sun & Qiang Chen, 2014. "Measuring the Effects of Decollectivization on China's Agricultural Growth: A Panel GMM Approach, 1970-1987," SDU Working Papers 2014-05, School of Economics, Shandong University.
    12. Huang, Jikun & Rozelle, Scott & Martin, William J. & Liu, Yu, 2007. "Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in China," Agricultural Distortions Working Paper 48478, World Bank.
    13. repec:eee:jeborg:v:142:y:2017:i:c:p:320-330 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Joshua Herries & Daniel I. Rees & Jeffrey S. Zax, 2003. "Interdependence in worker productivity," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(5), pages 585-604.
    15. Mead, Robert W., 2000. "China's agricultural reforms: The importance of private plots," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 54-78.
    16. Carter, Colin A. & Zhang, Bin, 1998. "The Weather Factor and Variability in China's Grain Supply," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 529-543, September.
    17. David Masclet, 2003. "L'analyse de l'influence de la pression des pairs dans les équipes de travail," CIRANO Working Papers 2003s-35, CIRANO.
    18. Dong, Xiao-yuan & Putterman, Louis, 1997. "Productivity and Organization in China's Rural Industries: A Stochastic Frontier Analysis," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 181-201, April.
    19. Li, Haizheng & Zax, Jeffrey S., 2003. "Labor supply in urban China," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 795-817, December.

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