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Monitoring Costs in Chinese Agricutural Teams

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  • Dong, Xiao-yuan
  • Dow, Gregory K

Abstract

Large productivity gains have been observed in Chinese agriculture following the transition from collective farming to household contracting. Using a model of mutual monitoring in an egalitarian production team, the authors estimate that labor supervision absorbed about 10-20 percent of total labor time for a sample of Chinese agricultural teams during 1970-76. These agency costs are lower than comparable estimates derived from aggregate data. Copyright 1993 by University of Chicago Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Dong, Xiao-yuan & Dow, Gregory K, 1993. "Monitoring Costs in Chinese Agricutural Teams," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(3), pages 539-553, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:101:y:1993:i:3:p:539-53
    DOI: 10.1086/261886
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jeffery Carpenter & Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, 2006. "Mutual Monitoring in Teams: Theory and Experimental Evidence on the Importance of Reciprocity," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0608, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
    2. Goeschl, Timo & Jarke, Johannes, 2017. "Trust, but verify? Monitoring, inspection costs, and opportunism under limited observability," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 320-330.
    3. Joshua Herries & Daniel I. Rees & Jeffrey S. Zax, 2003. "Interdependence in worker productivity," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(5), pages 585-604.
    4. Dong, Xiao-Yuan & Putterman, Louis, 2000. "Prereform Industry and State Monopsony in China," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 32-60, March.
    5. Mead, Robert W., 2000. "China's agricultural reforms: The importance of private plots," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 54-78.
    6. Dong, Xiao-yuan & Putterman, Louis, 1997. "Productivity and Organization in China's Rural Industries: A Stochastic Frontier Analysis," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 181-201, April.
    7. Goeschl, Timo & Jarke, Johannes, 2013. "Second vs. Third Party Punishment under Costly Monitoringː A New Experimental Method and Evidence," WiSo-HH Working Paper Series 6, University of Hamburg, Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences, WISO Research Laboratory.
    8. Fertő, Imre, 2002. "A mezőgazdasági termelés szerkezetének változásai a fejlett országokban, I. Miért a családi gazdaság a meghatározó üzemforma a fejlett országok mezőgazdaságában? [Changes in the structure of agricu," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 574-596.
    9. Goeschl, Timo & Jarke, Johannes, 2014. "Trust, but verify? When trustworthiness is observable only through (costly) monitoring," WiSo-HH Working Paper Series 20, University of Hamburg, Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences, WISO Research Laboratory.
    10. Carpenter, Jeffrey & Bowles, Samuel & Gintis, Herbert & Hwang, Sung-Ha, 2009. "Strong reciprocity and team production: Theory and evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 221-232, August.
    11. Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, 2002. "Social Capital and Community Governance," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(483), pages 419-436, November.
    12. Ferto, Imre & Fogarasi, Jozsef, 2005. "The Choice of Farm Organisation. A Hungarian Case," 94th Seminar, April 9-10, 2005, Ashford, UK 24420, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    13. Goeschl, Timo & Jarke, Johannes, 2016. "Second and third party punishment under costly monitoring," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 124-133.
    14. Zhang, Y., 2001. "Economics of transaction costs saving forestry," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 197-204, February.
    15. Li, Tianyou & Zhang, Junsen, 1998. "Returns to education under collective and household farming in China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 307-335, August.
    16. Dow,Gregory K., 2019. "The Labor-Managed Firm," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107589650, October.
    17. Goeschl, Timo & Jarke, Johannes, 2013. "Non-Strategic Punishment when Monitoring is Costly: Experimental Evidence on Differences between Second and Third Party Behavior," Working Papers 0545, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    18. Shengmin Sun & Qiang Chen, 2014. "Measuring the Effects of Decollectivization on China's Agricultural Growth: A Panel GMM Approach, 1970-1987," SDU Working Papers 2014-05, School of Economics, Shandong University.
    19. Huang, Jikun & Rozelle, Scott & Martin, William J. & Liu, Yu, 2007. "Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in China," Agricultural Distortions Working Paper Series 48478, World Bank.
    20. Shengmin Sun & Qiang Chen, 2020. "Household responsibility system and China's agricultural: Growth revisited: Addressing endogenous institutional change," Economics of Transition and Institutional Change, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 28(4), pages 537-558, October.
    21. Carter, Colin A. & Zhang, Bin, 1998. "The Weather Factor and Variability in China's Grain Supply," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 529-543, September.
    22. Dong, Xiao-Yuan, 1996. "Two-tier land tenure system and sustained economic growth in post-1978 rural China," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 24(5), pages 915-928, May.
    23. Nicklisch, Andreas & Putterman, Louis & Thöni, Christian, 2021. "Trigger-happy or precisionist? On demand for monitoring in peer-based public goods provision," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
    24. David Masclet, 2003. "L'analyse de l'influence de la pression des pairs dans les équipes de travail," CIRANO Working Papers 2003s-35, CIRANO.
    25. Li, Haizheng & Zax, Jeffrey S., 2003. "Labor supply in urban China," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 795-817, December.

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