IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Interdependence in worker productivity

  • Joshua Herries

    (Sears, Roebuck and Co, 3333 Beverly Rd, E5-306B, Hoffman Estates, IL 60179, USA)

  • Daniel I. Rees

    (University of Colorado at Denver, Department of Economics, Campus Box 181, Denver, CO 80217, USA)

  • Jeffrey S. Zax

    (University of Colorado at Boulder, Boulder, CO, USA)

This paper investigates interactions between co-worker productivity levels in a rich empirical context. Workers have unambiguous output measures, compensation that depends on individual and group output to differing degrees and potential peers beyond their immediate work group. Important productivity interdependencies exist, which could arise from the group-based component of compensation, peer pressure, common supervisors or information exchanges, but not group-based output or technological interdependence. Workers with the strongest individual incentives seem least sensitive to these interactions. In contrast, they are important to workers with no individual incentives. For these workers, peer pressure must be a powerful influence. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/jae.738
File Function: Link to full text; subscription required
Download Restriction: no

File URL: http://qed.econ.queensu.ca:80/jae/2003-v18.5/
File Function: Supporting data files and programs
Download Restriction: no

Article provided by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. in its journal Journal of Applied Econometrics.

Volume (Year): 18 (2003)
Issue (Month): 5 ()
Pages: 585-604

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:jae:japmet:v:18:y:2003:i:5:p:585-604
DOI: 10.1002/jae.738
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.interscience.wiley.com/jpages/0883-7252/

Order Information: Web: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/jcatalog/subscribe.jsp?issn=0883-7252 Email:


References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Hollander, Heinz, 1990. "A Social Exchange Approach to Voluntary Cooperation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1157-67, December.
  2. Chillemi, Ottorino & Gui, Benedetto, 1997. "Team Human Capital and Worker Mobility," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(4), pages 567-85, October.
  3. Barron, John M & Gjerde, Kathy Paulson, 1997. "Peer Pressure in an Agency Relationship," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(2), pages 234-54, April.
  4. Lazear, Edward P, 1986. "Salaries and Piece Rates," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(3), pages 405-31, July.
  5. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
  6. Drago, Robert & Garvey, Gerald T, 1998. "Incentives for Helping on the Job: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 1-25, January.
  7. Kandel, E. & Lazear, E.P., 1990. "Peer Pressure and Partnerships," Papers 90-07, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
  8. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-31, July.
  9. repec:sae:ilrrev:v:43:y:1990:i:3:p:165-182 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. Roy Radner, 1986. "Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(1), pages 43-57.
  11. Dong, Xiao-yuan & Dow, Gregory K, 1993. "Monitoring Costs in Chinese Agricutural Teams," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(3), pages 539-53, June.
  12. Roy Radner & Roger Myerson & Eric Maskin, 1986. "An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(1), pages 59-69.
  13. Brock, William A. & Durlauf, Steven N., 2001. "Interactions-based models," Handbook of Econometrics, in: J.J. Heckman & E.E. Leamer (ed.), Handbook of Econometrics, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 54, pages 3297-3380 Elsevier.
  14. Carmichael, H Lorne & MacLeod, W Bentley, 2000. "Worker Cooperation and the Ratchet Effect," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(1), pages 1-19, January.
  15. Daniel G. Hansen, 1997. "Worker Performance and Group Incentives: A Case Study," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 51(1), pages 37-49, October.
  16. B. Ruth Montgomery, 1989. "The Influence of Attitudes and Normative Pressures on Voting Decisions in a Union Certification Election," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 42(2), pages 262-279, January.
  17. Andrew Weiss, 1987. "Incentives and Worker Behavior: Some Evidence," NBER Working Papers 2194, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1994. "The Firm as an Incentive System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 972-91, September.
  19. Fehr, Ernst, et al, 1998. "When Social Norms Overpower Competition: Gift Exchange in Experimental Labor Markets," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(2), pages 324-51, April.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:jae:japmet:v:18:y:2003:i:5:p:585-604. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing)

or (Christopher F. Baum)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.