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Interdependence in worker productivity

Author

Listed:
  • Joshua Herries

    (Sears, Roebuck and Co, 3333 Beverly Rd, E5-306B, Hoffman Estates, IL 60179, USA)

  • Daniel I. Rees

    (University of Colorado at Denver, Department of Economics, Campus Box 181, Denver, CO 80217, USA)

  • Jeffrey S. Zax

    (University of Colorado at Boulder, Boulder, CO, USA)

Abstract

This paper investigates interactions between co-worker productivity levels in a rich empirical context. Workers have unambiguous output measures, compensation that depends on individual and group output to differing degrees and potential peers beyond their immediate work group. Important productivity interdependencies exist, which could arise from the group-based component of compensation, peer pressure, common supervisors or information exchanges, but not group-based output or technological interdependence. Workers with the strongest individual incentives seem least sensitive to these interactions. In contrast, they are important to workers with no individual incentives. For these workers, peer pressure must be a powerful influence. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Joshua Herries & Daniel I. Rees & Jeffrey S. Zax, 2003. "Interdependence in worker productivity," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(5), pages 585-604.
  • Handle: RePEc:jae:japmet:v:18:y:2003:i:5:p:585-604
    DOI: 10.1002/jae.738
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Fabio Sabatini, 2005. "Does Social Capital Improve Labour Productivity in Small and Medium Enterprises?," Others 0509011, EconWPA.
    2. Barmby, Tim & Sessions, John G. & Zangelidis, Alexandros, 2016. "Looking after number two? Competition, cooperation and workplace interaction," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 131(PA), pages 166-182.
    3. repec:eee:labeco:v:46:y:2017:i:c:p:110-117 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Romano, Richard E. & Tampieri, Alessandro, 2016. "Arts vs engineering: Choosing consumption of and investment in education," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 493-510.
    5. Michelle Brown & John Heywood, 2009. "Helpless in Finance: The Cost of Helping Effort Among Bank Employees," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 30(2), pages 176-195, June.
    6. Davezies, Laurent & D'Haultfoeuille, Xavier & Fougère, Denis, 2006. "Identification of Peer Effects Using Group Size Variation," IZA Discussion Papers 2324, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    7. Vera Brenčič, 2015. "Employers' Efforts to Deter Shirking in Teams: Evidence from Job Vacancies," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 29(1), pages 52-78, March.
    8. Aakvik, Arild & Hansen, Frank & Torsvik, Gaute, 2013. "Dynamic Peer Effects in Sales Teams," Working Papers in Economics 10/13, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
    9. Dan Ofori & Jocelyn Sackey, 2010. "Assessing Social Capital for Organisational Performance: Initial Exploratory Insights From Ghana," Organizations and Markets in Emerging Economies, Faculty of Economics, Vilnius University, vol. 1(2).
    10. Laurent Davezies & Xavier D'Haultfoeuille & Denis Fougère, 2009. "Identification of peer effects using group size variation," Econometrics Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 12(3), pages 397-413, November.
    11. Lee, Lung-fei, 2007. "Identification and estimation of econometric models with group interactions, contextual factors and fixed effects," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 140(2), pages 333-374, October.
    12. Fabio Sabatini, 2005. "Does Social Capital Improve Labour Productivity in Small and Medium Enterprises?," Others 0508005, EconWPA.
    13. Fabio Sabatini, 2006. "Does Social Capital Improve Labour Productivity in Small and Medium Enterprises," Working Papers 92, University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Public Economics.

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