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Sequential contests revisited

Author

Listed:
  • Marco Serena

    (Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance)

Abstract

In a past issue of this journal, Morgan (Public Choice 116:1–18, 2003) finds that aggregate effort is greater in sequential than in simultaneous lottery contests. We show that Morgan’s result is incorrect owing to a slip in a proof, and that aggregate effort turns out to be greater in sequential contests only if the contestants are sufficiently homogeneous. Additionally, we discuss the robustness of the corrected result to different specifications of the contest success function, and we partially restore Morgan’s case for sequential contests by showing that these contests are more desirable when maximizing only the effort of the winner, rather than maximizing the aggregate effort.

Suggested Citation

  • Marco Serena, 2017. "Sequential contests revisited," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 173(1), pages 131-144, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:173:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-017-0467-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-017-0467-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Stergios Skaperdas, 1996. "Contest success functions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
    2. Serena, Marco, 2017. "Quality contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 15-25.
    3. Morgan, John, 2003. "Sequential Contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 116(1-2), pages 1-18, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hinnosaar, Toomas, 2024. "Optimal sequential contests," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(1), January.
    2. Wang, Zhewei & Zhou, Lixue, 2022. "Information disclosure in sequential (and simultaneous) contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    3. Nava Kahana & Doron Klunover, 2017. "Sequential Lottery Contests with Multiple Participants," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2017-02, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    4. Kahana, Nava & Klunover, Doron, 2018. "Sequential lottery contests with multiple participants," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 126-129.
    5. Konstantinos Protopappas, 2023. "Manipulation of moves in sequential contests," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(3), pages 511-535, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Contest design; Sequential contests; Simultaneous contests;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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