We compare expected rent-seeking expenditures and efficiency of simultaneous versus sequential rent-seeking contests. We find that when two risk neutral ex ante identical agents are competing, sequential contests are ex ante Pareto superior to simultaneous contests. We then endogenize the timing decision of rent-seeking expenditures and show that with ex ante identical contestants, all subgame perfect equilibria of this game are sequential contests. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:116:y:2003:i:1-2:p:1-18. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.