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"Where Ignorance is Bliss, 'tis Folly to be Wise": Transparency in Contests

  • Denter, Philipp

    ()

  • Morgan, John

    ()

  • Sisak, Dana

    ()

Increasingly, lobbying groups are subject to transparency requirements, obliging them to provide detailed information about their business. We study the effect this transparency policy has on the nature of lobbying competition. Under mild conditions, mandated transparency leads to an increase in wastefulness of lobbying competition and a decline in expected allocative efficiency. Hence we identify a negative side-effect of transparency policy, which also has implications for various other fields such as political campaigning or firm competition.

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File URL: http://www1.vwa.unisg.ch/RePEc/usg/econwp/EWP-1128.pdf
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Paper provided by University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science in its series Economics Working Paper Series with number 1128.

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Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:usg:econwp:2011:28
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  1. Baye, Michael R & Kovenock, Dan & de Vries, Casper G, 1993. "Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application of the All-Pay Auction," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 289-94, March.
  2. Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela, 2001. "The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 542-558, June.
  3. Leininger, Wolfgang, 1993. " More Efficient Rent-Seeking--A Munchhausen Solution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 75(1), pages 43-62, January.
  4. Péter Eső & Bal�zs Szentes, 2007. "Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(3), pages 705-731.
  5. Kai Konrad & Wolfgang Leininger, 2007. "The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 165-174, September.
  6. Stergios Skaperdas, 1996. "Contest success functions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
  7. Kyung Hwan Baik & Shogren, Jason F., 1995. "Contests with spying," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 441-451, September.
  8. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1994. "An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction," Game Theory and Information 9409002, EconWPA.
  9. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C., 1992. "The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information," Papers 8-92-1, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
  10. Paul Milgrom, 2008. "What the Seller Won't Tell You: Persuasion and Disclosure in Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 22(2), pages 115-131, Spring.
  11. Qiang Fu, 2006. "Endogenous timing of contest with asymmetric information," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(1), pages 1-23, October.
  12. Shapiro, Carl, 1986. "Exchange of Cost Information in Oligopoly," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(3), pages 433-46, July.
  13. Felix Várdy & John Morgan, 2005. "The Value of Commitment in Contests and Tournaments when Observation is Costly," Public Economics 0504005, EconWPA.
  14. Kolmar, Martin & Rommeswinkel, Hendrik, 2013. "Contests with group-specific public goods and complementarities in efforts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 9-22.
  15. Kovenock, Dan & Morath, Florian & Münster, Johannes, 2010. "Information sharing in contests," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 334, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  16. Nti, Kofi O, 1999. " Rent-Seeking with Asymmetric Valuations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 98(3-4), pages 415-30, March.
  17. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2008. "Communicating quality: a unified model of disclosure and signalling," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(4), pages 973-989.
  18. Potters, Jan & van Winden, Frans, 1992. " Lobbying and Asymmetric Information," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 74(3), pages 269-92, October.
  19. Baik, Kyung H & Shogren, Jason F, 1992. "Strategic Behavior in Contests: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 359-62, March.
  20. Hurley, Terrance M. & Shogren, Jason F., 1998. "Effort levels in a Cournot Nash contest with asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 195-210, June.
  21. Cho, In-Koo & Kreps, David M, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221, May.
  22. Nicola Persico, 2000. "Information Acquisition in Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(1), pages 135-148, January.
  23. Morgan, John, 2003. " Sequential Contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 116(1-2), pages 1-18, July.
  24. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1989. "Politically Contestable Rents And Transfers," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 17-39, 03.
  25. Vives, Xavier, 1984. "Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and bertrand," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 71-94, October.
  26. Konrad, Kai A. & Leininger, Wolfgang, 2007. "The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information," Munich Reprints in Economics 22092, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  27. Lambsdorff, Johann Graf, 2002. " Corruption and Rent-Seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 113(1-2), pages 97-125, October.
  28. Barros, Fatima, 1997. "Asymmetric information as a commitment in oligopoly," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 207-225, February.
  29. M. Dewatripont & E. Maskin, 1995. "Contractual Contingencies and Renegotiation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(4), pages 704-719, Winter.
  30. repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-223989 is not listed on IDEAS
  31. Dixit, Avinash K, 1987. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 891-98, December.
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