Truthful Disclosure of Information
This article is about disclosure of quality. The question that it seeks to answer is: Does the free market offer enough incentive for business to disclose? The article concludes that whether information is of purely private value or not, more than the socially-optimal amount of disclosure takes place. The optimal policy is for the government to subsidize sale without disclosure. The article offers no support for the policy of mandatory disclosure. The results should be viewed with care, however, as they seem to depend on special features of the model, in particular the assumed impossibility of misrepresentation.
Volume (Year): 13 (1982)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
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