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Complete Information Pivotal-Voter Model with Asymmetric Group Size and Asymmetric Beneï¬ ts

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  • Christos Mavridis
  • Marco Serena

Abstract

We analyse a standard pivotal-voter model under majority rule, with two rival groups of players, each preferring one of two public policies and simultaneously deciding whether to cast a costly vote, as in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983). We allow the beneï¬ t of the favorite public policy to differ across groups and impose an intuitive reï¬ nement, namely that voting probabilities are continuous in the cost of voting to pin down a unique equilibrium. The unique cost-continuous equilibrium depends on a key threshold that compares the sizes of the two groups.

Suggested Citation

  • Christos Mavridis & Marco Serena, 2019. "Complete Information Pivotal-Voter Model with Asymmetric Group Size and Asymmetric Beneï¬ ts," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2019-17_2, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    • Handle: RePEc:mpi:wpaper:tax-mpg-rps-2019-17_2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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